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Information Sharing Environment (ISE) with the passage of the 2004 Intelligence Reform 
and Terrorism Prevention Act. Linked to the creation of the Office of the Director of 
National Intelligence and championed by that office’s program manager for the ISE, the 
ISE has contributed to national intelligence reform by attempting to improve 
information sharing across the federal, state, local, territorial, and tribal domains. 
Given the rise in domestic terrorist attacks and the progress of intelligence reform 
over the last 16 years, this thesis explores an analysis of the ISE’s effectiveness 
and an examination of alternative means of information sharing to address the 
remaining information-sharing challenges brought to light in attacks carried out 
between 2014 and 2017. Alternative information-sharing techniques have been used 
by our nation’s special operations forces and by our largest police force, the New York 
Police Department. The best practices of organizations such as these may be leveraged 
by the ISE to further future intelligence-sharing reform. 
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Terrorist attacks such as those between 2014 and early 2017 in Garland, San 
Bernardino, Orlando, Fort Lauderdale, Seaside, and Chelsea highlight the increased 
challenge of preventing terrorist and homegrown violent extremists in the homeland. At 
its core, the challenge for information sharing involves how federal, state, local, 
territorial, and tribal counterterrorism (CT) operations that collect, receive, and analyze 
act upon information and intelligence prior to an attack. The Information Sharing 
Environment (ISE) was intended to reform and improve how intelligence/information 
sharing for CT would be accomplished. Given the rising domestic terrorism threat almost 
13 years after the ISE was signed into law, this thesis analyzes the remaining ISE 
challenges and explores two alternative approaches to information sharing that may pave 
a different path toward building trust across the CT communities. 
The 9/11 Commission Report detailed a framework for future intelligence reform 
in section 13.2 titled Unity of Effort in the Intelligence community. While this directly 
led to the creation of the National Counter Terrorism Center, it was not until Congress 
passed the 2004 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) that 
information sharing for counterterrorism became law. The 2004 IRTPA created the ISE 
and defined it as “an overarching approach to strengthening the sharing of intelligence, 
terrorism, homeland security, law enforcement, and other information among federal, 
state, local, tribal, international, and private sector partners.” 1  However, despite the 
creation of the ISE and its program manager, challenges with information sharing exist. 
An inconsistent implementation dynamic has led to gaps in strategic CT capabilities. 
Local law enforcement lacks access to new, innovative national CT intelligence 
collection and analysis capabilities, which ultimately played a role in successful terrorist 
attacks from 2014 through 2017. Testimony from local leaders and other documentation 
                                                 




from national police organizations have linked the problem to a lack of local intelligence 
collection and sharing activities prior to the attacks. 
This thesis attempts to outline and detail some of the challenges for the ISE and 
its implementation of information sharing strategies since 9/11. However, this thesis also 
proposes that the solutions to these ISE challenges may already exist within two existing 
yet disparate counterterrorism programs: U.S. special operations forces (SOF) and the 
New York Police Department Intelligence Program. When the best practices of each 
model are combined, SOF/Team-of-Teams and the NYPD intelligence unit, they form a 
framework that contributes to an environment that fosters “robust, real-time information 
sharing” to the lowest operator level possible. Along with other recommended revisions 
from Congress, these case studies can contribute to an improved information-sharing 
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1 
I. INTRODUCTION: THE ISE, ITS IMPLEMENTATION, AND 
ALTERNATIVE INFORMATION SHARING STRATEGIES 
Terrorist attacks such as those between 2014 and 2017 in Garland, Texas; San 
Bernardino, California; Orlando and Fort Lauderdale, Florida; Seaside Park, New Jersey; 
and Chelsea, New York highlight the increased challenge of preventing terrorist and 
homegrown violent extremists (HVEs) in the homeland. At its core, the challenge for 
information sharing involves how federal, state, local, territorial and tribal (FSLTT) 
counterterrorism operations collect, receive, analyze, and act upon information 
/intelligence prior to an attack. Over the last decade and a half, the U.S. government has 
attempted to address intelligence sharing in support of counterterrorism operations in 
several ways. The 9/11 Commission Report details a framework for future intelligence 
reform in § 13.2, entitled “Unity of Effort in the Intelligence community.” While this 
“Unity of Effort” led to the creation of the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), it 
was not until Congress passed the 2004 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention 
Act (IRTPA) that information sharing for counterterrorism became law.1  
The 2004 IRTPA created the information-sharing environment (ISE), which was 
intended to reform and improve how intelligence/information sharing for CT would be 
accomplished. 2 The ISE is best defined as “an overarching approach to strengthening the 
sharing of intelligence, terrorism, homeland security, law enforcement, and other 
information among federal, state, local, tribal, international, and private sector partners.”3 
Given the rising domestic terrorism threat almost 13 years after the ISE was signed into 
law, this thesis analyzes the remaining ISE challenges and explores two alternative 
                                                 
1 Jerome P. Bjelopera, Terrorism Information Sharing and the Nationwide Suspicious Activity Report 
Initiative: Background and Issues for Congress (CRS Report No. 7-5700) (Washington, DC: Congressional 
Research Service, 2011), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/R40901.pdf, 1.  
2 According to the IRTPA, “The terms “information sharing environment’’ and ‘‘ISE’’ mean an 
approach that facilitates the sharing of terrorism information…” Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 
Prevention Act, Pub. Law No. 108-458 (2004), 28–29.  
3 U.S. Government Accountability Office [GAO], High-Risk Series an Update, Establishing Effective 
Mechanisms for Sharing and Managing Terrorism-Related Information to Protect the Homeland (GAO 15-
290) (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2015), http://www.gao.gov/ 
assets/670/668415.pdf, 227–240.  
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approaches to information sharing that may pave a different path toward building trust 
across the counterterrorism communities. It proposes that alternative approaches to 
counterterrorism are worth incorporating into future ISE reform.  
A. DEFINING THE PROBLEM 
As previously outlined, Congress created the ISE with the passage of the 2004 
IRTPA. Linked to the creation of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence 
(ODNI) and championed by its program manager (PM) for the Information Sharing 
Environment, the ISE has contributed to national intelligence reform by attempting to 
improve information-sharing policies and guidance across FSLTT domains.4 Given the 
rise in domestic terrorist attacks and the progress of intelligence reform over the last 16 
years, an analysis of the ISE’s effectiveness and an examination of alternative means of 
information sharing is necessary to address the remaining challenges brought to light in 
attacks carried out between 2014 and 2017. Over the last 16 years, the counterterrorism 
community has provided excellent examples of information-sharing strategies. Our 
nation’s special operations forces (SOF) and largest police force, the New York Police 
Department (NYPD), are possibly two of the best examples of integrated intelligence 
support for counterterrorism operations. It is time to consider how the best practices of 
these organizations might be leveraged by the ISE program office to further future 
national intelligence reform and information sharing.  
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The principal questions this thesis examines concern information sharing policy, 
accountability for implementation, and outcomes. The 2004 IRTPA defines the ISE as 
“an approach that facilitates the sharing of terrorism information, which approach may 
                                                 
4 As of mid-2017, the PM-ISE office has been designated as the new Partner Engagement Information 
Sharing Environment office or PE ISE. This office still retains the same responsibilities as and operations 
under the same authorities as the original PM ISE office under the Office of the Director of National 
Intelligence. Therefore, the same topics outlined within this thesis concerning the PM-ISE apply to the new 
PE ISE office. Throughout the thesis, I will refer to the PM ISE, this should be considered as synonymous 
with the new PE ISE designation. For more information on the new PE ISE office please reference the 
following online source: Office of the Director of National Intelligence, “Partnerships—ISE,” accessed 
October 15, 2017, https://www.dni.gov/index.php/who-we-are/organizations/ise/ise-partnerships.  
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include any methods determined necessary and appropriate.”5 While the passing of the 
IRTPA led to the creation of state and major urban area fusion centers and involved other 
ISE-centric programs, such as the program manager for ISE and the National 
Counterterrorism Center, this thesis asks the follow questions:  
• Has the ISE actually improved the capacity for agencies at all levels of 
government to conduct counterterrorism operations?  
• Moreover, given the continued challenges, how can the ISE leverage 
successful alternative information-sharing approaches, like those 
employed by the NYPD and SOF, to improve capacity and efficiency? 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The literature review focuses on primary and secondary sources that offer a 
review of the ISE since the 2004 IRTPA and two case studies (SOF and NYPD) that offer 
viable alternatives for ISE operations. What follows is a description of the literature 
across these two topically relevant areas for the ISE as well as an overview of the source 
material used in the two cases studies.  
1. National Level Challenges 
The national intelligence-sharing policy has changed significantly, not only since 
9/11 but also since the passage of the 2004 IRTPA. This research included a review of 
primary and secondary sources from government entities or analysis of associated 
government programs in an effort to analyze the current state of the ISE. For example, 
government documents like the National Intelligence Strategy (NIS), first developed in 
2005, were some of the first sources to articulate a new “national intelligence” policy and 
what was codified by the intent of the IRTPA.6 In addition, a review of the 2014 NIS 
reveals the historically unstable strategic environment in which it was written and the 
“perfect storm” of other events that have reduced and degraded the capabilities of the 
                                                 
5 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act.  
6 Office of the Director of National Intelligence, The National Intelligence Strategy of the United 
States of America Transformation through Integration and Innovation (Washington, DC: Office of the 
Director of National Intelligence, 2005), https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Newsroom/ 
Reports%20and%20Pubs/NISOctober2005.pdf, 3.  
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intelligence community.7 However, there are few additional details on either of these two 
major effects within the body of the 2014 NIS itself. The 2014 NIS does do an excellent 
job of outlining the intelligence community’s core objectives without revealing sources 
and methods of achieving them, which is critical to the protection of intelligence 
community capabilities. The 2014 NIS is a valuable source for outlining new initiatives 
like “anticipatory intelligence” and in mentioning intelligence community functional 
areas that need additional improvement and focus.8  
The 2014 NIS and previous editions do not provide the specific details that 
facilitate implementation. Additionally, it lacks prioritization of the mission and 
enterprise objectives sections. However, it does reference another document, the National 
Intelligence Priorities Framework, which sets prioritization for the intelligence 
community. The 2014 NIS provides a specific emphasis on the need for “unity of effort” 
across the intelligence community and states that products should be “classified at the 
lowest possible level.” 9  However, the NIS does not elaborate whether that phrasing 
means a reduction in the amount of dissemination controls on intelligence products or 
how “unity of effort” translates to increased interagency all-source analysis and 
production.  
These types of non-specific operational guidance products could offer detailed 
implementation strategies for improving intelligence sharing but currently do not, leading 
to the strategic challenges that endure within the ISE. Other primary sources that reveal 
strategic issues related to the ISE include the GAO report Establishing Effective 
Mechanisms for Sharing and Managing Terrorism-Related Information to Protect the 
Homeland. This report reviews GAO efforts at monitoring federal implementation of the 
                                                 
7 Zach Bowling, “DNI: Fiscal Challenges and Snowden Leaks Created ‘Perfect Storm,’” Homeland 
Security Today, September 30, 2014, http://www.hstoday.us/single-article/dni-fiscal-challenges-and-
snowden-leaks-created-perfect-storm/de6feaa607915b03c637cbcafb32cb1e.html.  
8 Office of the Director of National Intelligence, The National Intelligence Strategy of the United 
States of America (Washington, DC: Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2014), 
http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/2014_NIS_Publication.pdf, 5–6.  
9 Ibid., 16.  
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ISE. 10  The GAO is a critical source when addressing the progress of the federal 
government’s intelligence sharing efforts since the 2004 Intelligence Reform and 
Terrorism Prevention Act.11 This GAO report also reviews the implementation plans that 
provide “detailed guidance” for priority objectives and milestones.12 Posner, in his 2005 
work Preventing Surprise Attacks: Intelligence Reform in the Wake of 9/11, offers a 
valuable and independent analysis of the early implications and issues surrounding the 
2004 IRTPA and intelligence reform in general. 13  The DOD Joint Staff’s Joint 
Intelligence (JP 2-0) reviews “the current guidance for conducting joint and multinational 
intelligence activities across the range of military operations.”14 While this source is 
specific to the DOD, there are plenty of applicable components within the JP 2-0 for 
domestic intelligence operations, such as the “principles of joint intelligence.”15  
The DHS’s Quadrennial Homeland Security Review Report: A Strategic 
Framework for a Secure Homeland in 2010 and the DOD Quadrennial Defense Review 
of 2014 set their respective organizations’ enterprise missions, objectives, and strategies 
for the next four years.16 However, these sources do not accurately characterize national 
ISE efforts to date. Also, they do not provide enough operational or implementation 
guidance and funding to achieve improvements within the information/intelligence 
sharing environment. Other sources for evaluating the strategic problems for the national 
ISE, such as the National Intelligence Program (NIP)’s fiscal year (FY) 2016 factsheet 
and the House Homeland Security Committee (HSC)’s Terror Threat Snapshot, are 
useful for providing supporting details on the homeland’s domestic intelligence 
                                                 
10 GAO, Establishing Effective Mechanisms, 227.  
11 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act.  
12 Ibid., 228.  
13 Richard A. Posner, Preventing Surprise Attacks: Intelligence Reform in the Wake of 9/11 (Lantham, 
MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Inc., 2005).  
14 Joint Chiefs of Staff [JCS], Joint Intelligence (Joint Publication 2-0) (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs 
of Joint Staff, 2013), http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp2_0.pdf, 2.  
15 Ibid., 49.  
16 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, The 2014 Quadrennial Homeland Security Review Report 




capabilities.17 However, these sources are limited in how they relate to one another and 
in discussion of how the ODNI and HSC collaborate as part of the ISE.  
2. Local Challenges 
This literature review includes a summary of the field limitations for local 
programs, which hinder improved intelligence sharing among counterterrorism law 
enforcement, intelligence, and security partners. One of the best sources in this regard is 
Erik Dahl’s article “Local Approaches to Counterterrorism: The New York Police 
Department Model.” Dahl observes that the current approach to counterterrorism is 
mostly at the federal and national-level approach, and he proposes an alternative solution. 
Considering that most responses to terrorism are local, he goes on to state that the 
current, federal approach is flawed: “Although it is often recognized that ‘all terrorism is 
local,’ most counterterrorism is federal or above.”18 In addition, Dahl explores how the 
homeland’s largest police department, the NYPD, has also recognized this flawed 
approach to counterterrorism and how it has implemented a unique alternative approach 
to solving some of the issues surrounding intelligence sharing. For instance, it integrates 
interagency and intergovernmental representatives in a “joint style” operational 
intelligence environment as one of those steps. While there are issues that remain 
regarding the effectiveness of implementing such a strategy on a national scale or by 
other localities, such a program serves as a potential solution to tactical intelligence 
sharing problems. Other authors like Lowenthal, Gerber and Sims, and Zegart also cover 
aspects of ISE challenges but do so with a focus on national-level policy.19 A comparison 
among the sources that focus on national-level and local-level information sharing 
                                                 
17 Office of the Director of National Intelligence, “FY 2016 National Intelligence Program Fact 
Sheet,” accessed October 15, 2017, https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Newsroom/Press%20Releases/ 
FY2017NIPRequestedfactsheet.pdf; House Committee on Homeland Security, “The Islamist Terror 
Threat,” Terror Threat Snapshot (November 2015), https://homeland.house.gov/wp-
content/uploads/2015/11/November-Terror-Threat-Snapshot.pdf.  
18 Erik J. Dahl, “Local Approaches to Counterterrorism: The New York Police Department Model,” 
Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism 9, no. 2 (2014): 81.  
19 Mark M. Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy (Washington DC: CQ Press, 2011), 
Kindle ed; Burton Gerber and Jennifer E. Sims, Transforming U.S. Intelligence (Washington DC: 
Georgetown University Press, 2005), Kindle ed; Amy B. Zegart, Spying Blind: The CIA, the FBI, and the 
Origins of 9/11 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), Kindle ed. 
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challenges is missing from the sources reviewed for this thesis. Additionally, the 
overwhelming majority of sources reviewed focused solely on national-level ISE policy 
and operations rather than the local aspects of intelligence sharing.  
Other dimensions of the local problem for intelligence sharing are how and what 
intelligence is gathered and its importance to different jurisdictions. Heuer’s Psychology 
of Intelligence Analysis offers a unique perspective from seasoned intelligence analysts 
who present explanations on topics such as biases, lack of analytical science knowledge 
and application, as well as the quality and evolution of analysis within Central 
Intelligence Agency over time. 20  This source offers a great deal of insight into the 
challenges still impacting local agencies, such as NYPD’s Intelligence Division and DHS 
field intelligence officers. The bias that remote headquarters’ intelligence cells have the 
best analysis regarding threats experienced in local neighborhoods is not addressed in 
most of the literature. However, sources like Psychology of Intelligence Analysis and 
Spying Blind reveal aspects of biases that may help explain why the headquarters model 
for local threat analysis still permeates the U.S. national intelligence capacity. 21 
Additionally, Busch and Givens explore the quality of intelligence shared as part of 
recent national intelligence reform and explore the impact intelligence has had across the 
FSLTT domains.22  
One common theme in the literature is how the very structure of the U.S. 
intelligence community may not facilitate intelligence sharing and cooperation at the 
local level. In addition to Dahl’s article on NYPD’s intelligence capability, other sources 
explain the intelligence community’s structure and the types of intelligence it produces in 
an effort to see whether these concepts and techniques can be applied or to determine 
whether they are indeed being applied at the local level. For example, Dahl’s Intelligence 
                                                 
20 Richards J. Heuer, Psychology of Intelligence Analysis (Langley, VA: Center for the Study of 
Intelligence, 1999), https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-
and-monographs/psychology-of-intelligence-analysis/.  
21 Zegart, Spying Blind.  
22 Nathan E. Busch and Austen D. Givens, “Information Sharing and Public-Private Partnerships: The 
Impact on Homeland Security,” The Homeland Security Review 7, no. 2 (2013): 123–150.  
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and Surprise Attack theorizes that surprise attacks happen as a result of the failure to 
merge strategic and tactical intelligence. Policy makers tend to be briefed on strategic 
intelligence, while tactical intelligence may sound the actual local warning.23 Another 
example, Lowenthal’s Intelligence from Secrets to Policy, presents the composition and 
construction of the intelligence community along with the different types of intelligence 
capacities, from human intelligence (HUMINT) to signals intelligence (SIGINT).24 In his 
book, Lowenthal also touches on post-9/11 intelligence reform, such as the elevation of 
the much overlooked open-source intelligence (OSINT) category as a full “INT” 
requiring the intelligence community to codify and standardize OSINT implementation 
across its various agencies.25 The incorporation of a comprehensive, local, all-source 
intelligence capacity is a critical component to improving the ISE. However, Lowenthal 
falls short of agreeing with one of this thesis’s critical arguments for intelligence reform, 
which is the need for the intelligence community to invest more heavily in local 
intelligence support programs. Investment in these local programs might help break up 
the “stovepipes” that he, Dahl, the 9/11 Commission, and other authors speak of as a 
central and enduring obstacle for integrated government-wide intelligence operations.  
Last, the use of examples of local intelligence successes and failures, with an 
emphasis on how intelligence sharing and collaboration either helped or hindered the 
local agency operation, serves to elaborate issues referenced in earlier sources but with 
real-world impact. Cases described in sources like McGhee’s master’s thesis, “The 
Wicked Problem of Information Sharing” and cases such as the San Bernardino and Paris 
attacks provide examples of what works and does not work on varying scales of CT 
operations. 26 Additionally, interviews with local law enforcement executives, such as 
NYPD Deputy Commissioner of Intelligence John Miller on the quality of the ISE within 
                                                 
23 Erik J. Dahl, Intelligence and Surprise Attack: Failure and Success from Pearl Harbor to 9/11 and 
Beyond (Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 2013), Kindle ed., 1–2.  
24 Lowenthal, Secrets to Policy, 431–433.  
25 Ibid.  
26 G. C. Sam McGhee, “The Wicked Problem of Information Sharing in Homeland Security: A 




New York City are critical to this thesis. One scholarly interview with commentary from 
retired General Michael V. Hayden is included in this thesis and when combined with 
Posner’s independent analysis of the 2004 IRTPA, the reader gains a more accurate sense 
of the challenges the ODNI and ISE face. 27 Future interviews with senior leaders from 
the ISE should be incorporated into the literature concerning this topic. In contrast, there 
seems to be a great number of primary and secondary government sources of information 
related to the strategic challenges of intelligence sharing. The greatest challenge in 
research for this thesis was narrowing the focus to relevant sources for local urban threat 
and field intelligence environs.  
3. The SOF and NYPD Case Studies 
A number of senior counterterrorism leaders from around the world have spoken 
about the “unprecedented” nature of the current terrorist threat environment. This 
demands a level of commitment to improving intelligence sharing that rivals the climate 
shortly after 9/11. Chapter III of the thesis focuses on practical solutions offered by field 
intelligence activities at the local level. Dahl’s article, “Local Approaches to 
Counterterrorism,” serves as one of the baseline sources for this section. 28 This thesis 
utilizes information revealing NYPD’s Intelligence Unit and its comprehensive liaison 
intelligence officer program sourced from the interview for this thesis with John Miller 
and detailed by Dahl in “Local Approaches to Counterterrorism.”  
However, a variety of sources from the DOD special operations community, such 
as the Special Warfare Journal, contain valuable corollary and case study information 
offering possible alternative information sharing techniques for ISE consideration. While 
not a magic bullet, some of these techniques, integrated as part of a more comprehensive 
domestic intelligence program, may offer a practical fix to some ISE challenges. Authors 
Dahl, Lowenthal, Posner, and Zegart also touch on some of the proposed solutions, such 
as the creation of the ODNI, which DHS implemented, and others that have not been 
                                                 
27 Posner, Preventing Surprise, 5–15.  
28 Dahl, “Local Approaches,” 81–97.  
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implemented, such as the creation of a domestic intelligence agency. These sources focus 
on strategic-level information sharing solutions. This thesis seeks to merge both strategic 
and tactical techniques for a more comprehensive solution suite. 
D. FRAMEWORK FOR EXPLORING THE ISE  
This thesis argues that two major challenge areas remain for the ISE: national-
level policy and focus as well as local-level access and implementation. Research for this 
thesis reveals that in these challenge areas, the ISE can be characterized by unclear and 
competing implementation strategies, a lack of alternative approaches to information 
sharing, and a lack of clear interagency policy. These areas should be addressed in a 
holistic way to improve counterterrorism functionality and access across multiple, 
disparate domains. Moreover, research for this thesis reveals that the ISE could be 
structured in a way to facilitate the continued integration of these challenges with the 
latest, most successful approaches to counterterrorism regardless of jurisdiction. What 
follows is the framework for the forthcoming discussion and the analysis in the chapters 
that follow.  
1. National Level Challenges 
The ISE’s national-level challenges can be characterized by an overemphasis on 
intelligence community information-sharing reform within the national capital region, 
which narrowly focuses on federal agencies. Poor or non-existent implementation 
strategies to increase information sharing following the 2004 IRTPA mandate, has 
limited local agency access to high-quality classified information and facilities. There are 
several information-sharing mechanisms; however, many agencies have not fully 
complied with ISE reform initiatives, as detailed in the Government Accountability 
Office (GAO)’s high-risk report regarding government-wide information-sharing 
mechanisms. 29  Additionally, the program manager for ISE has limited capacities to 
address noncompliance with its issued strategies. 
                                                 
29 GAO, Establishing Effective Mechanisms, 227–240.  
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2. Local Challenges 
Local-level challenges to improving information-sharing for the ISE are mostly 
characterized by a failure to ensure integrated information-sharing processes and access 
across all entities operating at the local level. For instance, the overemphasis on existing 
structures, such as the Joint Terrorism Task Force and lower-quality unclassified 
intelligence, has led to the appearance of improvement in information-sharing at local 
levels. While there are excellent examples of integrated structures that facilitate precise 
and time-sensitive ISE operations, such as those of the NCTC, these are exclusively 
national capabilities. This is in part because the NCTC and other similar intelligence 
community structures—along with their vast sensitive compartmented information 
facilities, advanced analytic capacities, and interagency representation—are national-
level organizations supporting national counterterrorism operations, but not necessarily 
local operations or investigations. At the local level, challenges still remain for 
organizations to access the same types of intelligence data that NCTC has at all 
classification levels. Furthermore, the program manager for ISE has no direct control 
over these local field intelligence assets and, therefore, cannot accurately track or ensure 
that field/local agencies have access to all intelligence community capabilities or are fully 
compliant under ISE legislation and policies.  
3. SOF and NYPD Alternatives 
In order to address my second thesis question regarding information sharing 
alternatives, the following question had to be researched: are there alternatives to how the 
ISE is structured and implemented that would improve local access to high-quality 
information? To find an answer, this thesis focuses on qualitative research, reflecting on 
two case studies that the author is intimately familiar with as a career intelligence officer. 
The first case study is of the SOF environment. SOF operators have employed operations 
and planning cells within counterterrorism environments for almost 20 years. The SOF 
approach organizes mission planning and operations cells with representatives from 
different support disciplines who bring their expertise and domain capacities, often in 
unique and innovative ways, to the SOF environment.  
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The second case study overviews the NYPD approach to intelligence. As our 
nation’s largest police force, the NYPD has many unique programs that mirror SOF 
capabilities. Foremost is the how NYPD integrates national and international agencies 
into its intelligence and counterterrorism structures on a continuous basis. Furthermore, 
the NYPD, like SOF, manages these programs not as part of the ISE or its initiatives but 
through independent operational needs and experiences. The SOF technique in 
combination with the NYPD’s local model could be part of a more integrated solution to 
help address the continued ISE challenges.  
E. METHODOLOGY 
This thesis explores the best practices of the SOF and NYPD and applies them to 
the historiographical analysis of ISE challenges explored in the thesis. The author uses 
primary and secondary source materials from official government resources as evidence 
outlining the current ISE challenges. Examples of these sources range from reports and 
other similar publications from the GAO, other government agencies, and scholars. This 
approach has the benefit of revealing what government agencies and other scholarly 
sources are saying about the ISE itself. However, there is little hard data detailing the 
relative successes or failures of the ISE outside firsthand accounts from these types of 
sources. The analysis presented in this thesis relies on the work of other experts and 
senior leaders in the field to characterize ISE as it is currently operating. Further 
empirical evidence includes an interview conducted with NYPD Deputy Commissioner 
for Intelligence John Miller and other testimony from senior leaders, such as former 
Boston Police Commissioner Ed Davis, who have been directly affected by the current 
state of the ISE.  
1. Data Sources 
This thesis reviews and compares government policy and reports as the primary 
sources. Secondary sources also include qualitative analysis and anecdotal commentary 
from academics and government agencies, such as congressional testimony, analyzing 
ISE-relevant policies and their effectiveness since the 2004 IRTPA. Last, there is 
growing literature recently published in media sources, such as Erik Dahl’s article 
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describing NYPD’s intelligence programs, detailing successful initiatives. These sources 
are also used in the solutions section and when combined with publications from the 
DOD’s Joint Special Operations University, describe how the integration of specialized 
capabilities from the intelligence community can contribute to government-wide 
counterterrorism operations. 
2. Limitations 
Due to the amount of existing qualitative research, policy analysis, and 
congressional testimony on information sharing, this thesis does not provide another 
policy analysis on fusion centers or similar state-owned ISE capacities. The case study 
overview does not attempt to review fusion centers (urban, regional, or otherwise) since 
there has been a plethora of material written about this popular solution to the 2004 
IRTPA. However, this thesis does address how fusion center ISE-related operations are 
either absent or have been inadequately implemented, leaving locals and stakeholders 
without ISE support. Additionally, with the exception of the interview conducted with 
NYPD’s John Miller, this research plan avoided conducting interviews or other activities 
such as surveys, due to the depth and breadth of available published policy information 
including actual policies, policy critiques, and prior theses. Furthermore, due to 
interagency sensitivities and access limitations, this thesis avoids Federal Bureau of 
Investigation information-sharing policies, but it does discuss the organization’s role in 
potential integrated solutions to the challenges within ISE. Additionally, this thesis 
focuses on the information-sharing challenges between the national and local levels. 
While there are similar issues with information sharing between these two groups and 
state-level organizations, the focus of this thesis remains with the under-explored national 
and local information sharing challenges. Finally, this research design does not explore 
the specific terrorism cases themselves but rather focuses on the intelligence sharing 
techniques and relevant programs alone.  
3. Case Study Best Practices Overview 
This research includes an overview and comparison of two case studies in an 
effort to examine them for potential solutions to the research questions. Specifically, the 
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NYPD and SOF methods of intelligence, information sharing, and counterterrorism 
operations planning are reviewed and compared with the aim to extract the best practices 
of each. In addition, analysis focused on the commonalities and differences between the 
NYPD and SOF models for CT information sharing.30 The researcher then compared 
these commonalities to the analysis found in sources such as the GAO’s High Threat 
Series, Dahl’s articles on both the NYPD and the hunt for Bin Laden.31 Finally, this 
thesis proposes a blending of the best practices of each that leverages existing national 
intelligence community capabilities to improve all-source intelligence and the ISE as a 
whole for local counterterrorism operators.  
F. THESIS ORGANIZATION 
Chapter II focuses on exploring the aforementioned ISE challenges. Chapter III 
reviews two cases, SOF and NYPD, which offer best practices that may offer solutions to 
the remaining ISE challenges. The concluding chapter ends with an exploration of the 
legal and political challenges that remain in implementing the solutions. It also explores 
what implementation of the solutions may look like from a local counterterrorism 
perspective. 
 
                                                 
30 Stanley McChrystal et al., Team of Teams: New Rules of Engagement for a Complex World (New 
York: Penguin, 2015), Kindle ed.; Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Intelligence Support to Joint Operations 
(Joint Publication 2-02) (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1998), https://fas.org/irp/ 
doddir/dod/jp2_02.pdf; Linda B. Williams, Intelligence Support to Special Operations in the Global War 
on Terrorism (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2004), handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA424015.  
31 Dahl, “Local Approaches.”  
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II. THE INFORMATION SHARING ENVIRONMENT AND 
CHALLENGES FOR COUNTERTERRORISM  
Contrasted with the strong partnership by local, state and federal law 
enforcement at the crime scenes and command posts, there is a gap with 
information sharing at a higher level while there are still opportunities to 
intervene in the planning of these terrorist events. I speak specifically 
about the Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTF). The Boston Police 
Department has four members assigned to the JTTF in Boston. All have 
the appropriate security clearances and many of the Task Force Members 
have served in that capacity for a number of years. Information sharing 
with local law enforcement task force members needs to be improved. 
——Edward F. Davis, Police Commissioner Boston Police Department 
before the Homeland Security and Government Affairs Committee United 
States Senate Wednesday, July 10, 201332 
A major part of the 2004 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act 
(IRTPA) focuses on information-sharing challenges and it has attempted to address them 
by creating the information-sharing environment (ISE). However, as described by 
organizations such as the Major Cities Chiefs Association (MCCA), since 9/11 the 
national ISE policy has been incompletely implemented at the local counterterrorism 
level. 33  Inconsistent implementation by ISE partners has led to gaps in strategic 
counterterrorism capabilities. Inconsistent local law enforcement access to innovative 
national intelligence collection and analysis capabilities has ultimately played a role in 
successful terrorist attacks from 2014 through early 2017. Testimony from local leaders 
and documentation from national police organizations have linked the problem to a lack 
of local intelligence collection and sharing prior to the attacks.  
                                                 
32 Lessons Learned from the Boston Marathon Bombings: Preparing for and Responding to the Attack 
Hearing of Homeland Security and Government Affairs Committee United States Senate (2013) (testimony 
of Edward F. Davis Police Commissioner Boston Police), https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/hearings/lessons-
learned-from-the-boston-marathon-bombings-preparing-for-and-responding-to-the-attack.   
33 Major Cities Chiefs Association, Criminal Intelligence Enterprise Initiative (Major Cities Chiefs 




This chapter focuses on the specific ISE challenges that local field-based 
counterterrorism agencies face and critiques the ISE overall. Research reveals two main 
areas of ISE challenges: strategic, which are a result of national policies and how they 
have been implemented; and tactical, which local agencies face as a result of existing ISE 
implementation strategies. This thesis reviews the overarching ISE policies, its 
implementation strategy to date, as well as various assessments and actual testimony 
from senior leaders/subject matter experts on the impact these policies have had on local 
agencies. 
A. NATIONAL LEVEL CHALLENGES 
According to Dahl in “Local Approaches to Counterterrorism,” the United States 
has been overly focused on national-level counterterrorism approaches that include 
favoring military and other governmental assets to detect and deter international terrorism 
plots.34 Recent homeland attacks in Boston, San Bernardino, as well as Chelsea/Seaside 
suggest there is a growing trend in domestic terrorism that federal approaches have 
struggled to detect beforehand.35 One can infer that the creation of the ISE by the 2004 
IRTPA was designed to address all the intelligence-sharing concerns described in the 
9/11 Commission Report. The 9/11 Commission’s recommendations focused on 
restructuring the intelligence community to reduce barriers to performing joint 
intelligence work, consolidating the divided management of national intelligence 
capabilities, developing common standards and practices across foreign and domestic 
intelligence community capacities, and reducing complexity to improve resource 
priorities.36 The 9/11 Commission’s recommendations led to several distinct actions: the 
creation of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) and the National 
                                                 
34 Dahl, “Local Approaches,” 82.  
35 Cities listed are located in the following states respectively: Massachusetts, California, New York, 
and New Jersey.  
36 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States [9/11 Commission], The 9/11 
Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States 
New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc. 2004).  
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Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) as well as an outline for the ISE concept. 37 Since the 
2004 IRTPA, the ODNI has created the program manager for ISE, whose role is to 
establish policy standards and implementation guidance. 38  Three topics outline the 
strategic or national-level challenges remaining for ISE: gaps in ODNI authorities, the 
focus on national reform, and a lack of uniform classification standards for terrorism 
information.39  
1. Gaps in the ODNI Mandate 
The 2004 IRTPA represents the greatest restructuring of the intelligence 
community and strategic intelligence since the National Security Authorization Act of 
1947 established them.40 The 2004 IRTPA left intentional gaps in the ODNI authorities, 
which have led to inconsistent implementation as well as a lack of agency accountability. 
The ODNI lacks a mandate that all intelligence community agencies provide sister 
agencies access to counterterrorism intelligence. The result is a mixed bag of access 
across the homeland security environment whereby local law enforcement agencies, 
regardless of existing security clearance level, have no regular access to available 
classified intelligence holdings and analysis. For counterterrorism purposes, no single 
organization has complete knowledge of the full range of intelligence for a specific 
threat.41  
Although the president has the final authority in ODNI actions toward cabinet-
level intelligence agency heads, Section 1018 of the IRTPA has resulted in intelligence 
community partners ignoring the ODNI and its program manager’s ISE guidance. 
                                                 
37 Posner, Preventing Surprise Attacks, 59–61.  
38 Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Program Manager Information Sharing Environment 
[PM-ISE], A Brief History of the Information Sharing Environment (Washington, DC: Information Sharing 
Environment 2015), https://www.ise.gov/sites/default/files/Brief_History_of_the_ISE.pdf.  
39 U.S. Government Accountability Office [GAO], Information Sharing Environment Better Road 
Map Needed to Guide Implementation and Investments (GAO-11-455) (Washington, DC: U.S. Government 
Accountability Office, 2011), http://www.gao.gov/assets/330/321672.pdf.  
40 Michael V. Hayden, “The State of the Craft: Is Intelligence Reform Working?” World Affairs, 
September/October 2010, http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/state-craft-intelligence-reform-
working.  
41 Posner, Preventing Surprise Attacks, 60–61.  
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Michael V. Hayden, former director of the National Security Agency (NSA), summarizes 
the limitations of the ODNI more precisely:  
The DNI could not abrogate the authorities of the cabinet officers of 
departments in which elements of the intelligence community were 
located. Section 1018 of the IRTPA, as it was called, was a determined 
push to protect the secretary of defense’s prerogatives when it came to his 
critical combat support agencies: the NSA, NGA [National Geospatial 
Intelligence Agency], and NRO [National Reconnaissance Office].42  
Nevertheless, executive orders have attempted to address original weaknesses in 
the 2004 IRTPA. One of the first early attempts at addressing the law came in 2007–2008 
with an amendment to Executive Order (EO) 12333.43 Furthermore, in an attempt by the 
president to ensure intelligence sharing, according to EO 12333, the intelligence 
community  
shall establish common security and access standards for managing and 
handling intelligence systems, information, and products, with special 
emphasis on facilitating: (A) The fullest and most prompt access to and 
dissemination of information and intelligence practicable, assigning the 
highest priority to detecting, preventing, preempting, and disrupting 
terrorist threats and activities against the United States, its interests, and 
allies.44  
This section of EO 12333 is critical for establishing and maintaining ISE 
activities. However, the EO does not outline any penalties or systems of redress for 
agencies that ignore ODNI guidance in this area. Because the DNI cannot abrogate the 
authority of agency heads, independent agencies may simply ignore the program 
manager’s intelligence dissemination programs and prioritize their own agency activities 
in countering terrorism threats.  
                                                 
42 Hayden, “The State of the Craft.”  
43 Ibid.  
44 Exec. Order No. 12333, United States Intelligence Activities (as amended by Exec. Orders Nos. 
13284 (2003), 13355 (2004) and 13470 (2008)), Code of Federal Regulations 73 FR 45325 (2008): 45323–
45342, https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2008/08/04/E8-17940/further-amendments-to-
executive-order-12333-united-states-intelligence-activities. Exec. Order No. 12333 was amended on three 
subsequent occasions in the years 2003, 2004, and 2008.  
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2. Field Intelligence Limitations  
Two of the five ISE stakeholder agencies identified by the program manager 
increased field or local-level ISE support, primarily by increasing field investigators, 
agents, analysts, and other personnel in specific locations.45 However, while the NCTC 
and DNI have created domestic representative programs, the programs have resulted in 
relatively few officers actually stationed to high-threat areas. For instance as of early 
2017, the NCTC’s Domestic Liaison Program has only one regional representative 
covering territory from Maine to Delaware.46 Additionally, while the joint terrorism task 
forces (JTTFs) are supplemented with additional analytic capacity during national and 
special local events as well as other elevated threat environments, the National Capital 
Region (NCR) predominantly receives the counterterrorism capabilities of the 
intelligence community.47 Part of this challenge is the lack of trained field intelligence 
analysts who have access to and knowledge of the intelligence community capabilities 
available to the NCR-based NCTC, but in support of local counterterrorism operations. 
This absence of coordinated and integrated intelligence frameworks has led to field 
intelligence representatives developing their own processes that may be inconsistent with 
broader national and local initiatives. Ideally, the ODNI, along with the PM ISE, would 
have the regulatory and budgetary authority to revise the nation’s field intelligence 
capacities, but the ODNI currently lacks legislative authority over these programs. The 
                                                 
45 According to the GAO report 11-455, “The stakeholder agencies we reviewed are the five key 
agencies the Program Manager [ISE] identified, consistent with the Intelligence Reform Act, as critical to 
developing and implementing the ISE—the Departments of Homeland Security (DHS), Justice (DOJ), 
State (State), and Defense (DOD), as well as the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI). 
These agencies represent five information sharing communities that collect the homeland security, law 
enforcement, foreign affairs, defense, and intelligence information deemed critical for sharing in order to 
provide for homeland security.” GAO, Information Sharing Environment, 7.  
46 Hearing before the House Committee on Homeland Security, Understanding the Homeland Threat 
Landscape, 112th Cong. (2012) (statement of Matthew G. Olsen), https://www.nctc.gov/docs/2012_07_25_ 
HHS_Understanding_Homeland_Threat_Landscape.pdf. As of March 2017, NCTC’s Domestic 
Representative program was now up to 11 representatives across major cities and regions in the United 
States. For more information, please see https://oig.justice.gov/reports/2017/a1721.pdf, 38.  
47 Edward Connors, Planning and Managing Security for Major Special Events: Guidelines for Law 




aforementioned limitations at the field level result in a dynamic wherein intelligence 
reform is concentrated in the NCR. 
a. Classification Standards 
Research conducted for this thesis, as well as interview information from John 
Miller, suggests that the intelligence community is still over-classifying terrorism-related 
information. While there are several information-sharing mechanisms through the PM 
ISE and through EOs 13356 and 13388, the intelligence community partners still have the 
ability to restrict other intelligence community and ISE partners from classified material, 
even for the purpose of counterterrorism.48 As Posner elaborates in Preventing Surprise 
Attacks, the culture of the intelligence community still restricts increased sharing:  
Fear of penetration and leaks makes intelligence officers (and their 
services) reluctant to share information with each other fully and freely, 
which in turn makes it difficult to assemble scattered bits of information 
into a convincing mosaic.  . . . This reluctance is not only ad hoc; it is 
codified in the different rules of different intelligence units [agencies] 
regarding access to classified information. The 2004 IRTPA did not 
empower the ODNI to prescribe uniform standards for classification.49  
Uniform standards of classification across the intelligence community would essentially 
mean that all partners have a common set of rules by which to classify intelligence.  
The ODNI and the Information Sharing Council (ISC) have observed that the 
overuse of originator control (ORCON) has negatively affected current ISE 
counterterrorism operations. 50  When an originator of classified intelligence uses 
                                                 
48 PM ISE, A Brief History.  
49 Posner, Preventing Surprise Attacks, 102–103.  
50 The ODNI within its Intelligence Community Policy Guidance (ICPG) 710.1 memorandum defines 
ORCON as “a dissemination control marking” that restricts “the dissemination and extraction of 
information controlled by its originator.” The ICPG further clarifies “Controls on the dissemination and use 
of classified national intelligence are necessary to protect intelligence sources, methods, and activities. The 
use of ORCON enables the originator to maintain knowledge, supervision, and control of the distribution of 
ORCON information beyond its original dissemination. Further dissemination of ORCON information 
requires advance permission from the originator. The ORCON marking shall be applied judiciously in 
accordance with this ICPG to ensure that classified national intelligence is disseminated appropriately 
without undue delay or restriction.” Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Application of 
Dissemination Controls: Originator Control (Intelligence Community Policy Guidance 710.1) 
(Washington, DC: Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2012), 2.  
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ORCON, it prevents other agencies from distributing the information beyond the original 
dissemination without approval from the originator.51 A lack of uniform classification 
standards has enabled intelligence community agencies to continue using ORCON on 
terrorism intelligence. Currently, further dissemination of ORCON information requires 
advanced permission from the originator for every occurrence. Even when an agency 
receives permission to access ORCON material, it cannot pass that material along to its 
partner agencies without additional permissions from the originator.  
This requirement for authorization prior to dissemination slows down the real-
time sharing of intelligence and undermines field intelligence personnel by forcing them 
to coordinate intelligence-sharing activities with NCR-based approvers first. 
Additionally, the intelligence community’s use of ORCON isolates certain ISE partners 
from specific terrorism information simply based on the department to which an agency 
belongs. For example, a DOD partner may have ORCON intelligence on a specific 
individual, but because it is marked ORCON, the DOD partner is restricted from using 
and/or disseminating the information in support of any non-DOD counterterrorism 
activities. Previous guidance from DNI has stated, “The ORCON marking shall be 
applied judiciously in accordance with this [intelligence community policy guidance] 
ICPG to ensure that classified national intelligence is disseminated appropriately without 
undue delay or restriction.”52 Given the DNI guidance to judiciously apply this control, 
ORCON is still applied inappropriately to classified terrorism intelligence. As NYPD’s 
John Miller asked in an interview for this thesis,  
Now . . . [ORCON] makes sense on a number of levels if you’re dealing in 
espionage, nuclear proliferation, a host of national security issues, but 
when you’re dealing with terrorism, where the threat is to U.S. soil and to 
U.S. cities and to targets that are protected day-by-day by police, . . . how 
does this still make sense in the post-911 era?53  
                                                 
51 ODNI, Application of Dissemination Controls, 22.  
52 Ibid.  
53 John Miller (NYPD Deputy Commissioner for Intelligence and Counterterrorism), interview with 
author, October 17, 2016.  
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Miller argues that classification should not be used to restrict local law enforcement or 
intelligence community partners from accessing terrorism data even when one of the 
partners may choose to close a case. Overuse of ORCON and similar dissemination 
restrictions on terrorism intelligence damages the ability of counterterrorism operators to 
coordinate local threats that may span multiple jurisdictions. For example, if the FBI or 
intelligence community partner has information on a terrorism suspect but chooses not to 
the share information other ISE agencies that may encounter the suspect will have an 
incomplete intelligence picture of the potential threat that suspect poses. Recent terrorist 
attacks like those in Garland, Texas, and San Bernardino, California, highlight how the 
restriction of terrorism information can hurt investigations.  
b. Focus on National Reform 
The PM ISE is the principal authority for all ISE activities and generates an 
annual report to Congress outlining progress on GAO-mandated improvements. 54 
However, there is no reporting mechanism or forum that encourages local agency 
feedback for local activities within the ISE.55 Additionally, no local law enforcement 
agency or field intelligence activity is represented on the ISE’s Information Sharing 
Council or Information Sharing and Access Interagency Policy Committee. 56  The 
absence of these connections at the local level is likely due in large part to the strategic-
level focus of the PM ISE and the gaps left by weak implementation language within the 
2004 IRTPA itself.  
The 2004 IRTPA directs that the ODNI and NCTC must not be co-located with 
existing intelligence community facilities.57 However, the IRPTA does not recommend 
that these organizations necessarily bring national-level intelligence capacity outside 
                                                 
54 PM ISE, A Brief History.  
55 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act.  
56 “ISE Governance,” Program Manager Information Sharing Environment, accessed October 15, 
2016, https://www.ise.gov/ise-governance.  
57 Busch and Givens, “Information Sharing.”   
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Washington, DC, to the local level. 58  In fact, while the ODNI and NCTC face the 
daunting challenge of interagency intelligence collection as well as analysis operations 
and reform, there is no legal mandate that these two agencies distribute their robust 
capabilities to high-threat local communities. Additionally, while some ISE partners have 
dedicated field intelligence representatives, the PM ISE has no direct control over these 
assets. Therefore, the national PM office for information sharing can neither accurately 
track nor ensure various field intelligence activities have appropriate accesses while 
remaining fully compliant with established ISE legislation and policies.59 By focusing on 
intelligence community reform solely within Washington, DC region, the ISE has 
hampered the IRTPA’s intent of improving counterterrorism information-sharing across 
the FSLTT domains. These domains are primarily found in local field areas, not in 
Washington, DC.  
As an example of sustaining the continuum for national reform, two organizations 
have released reports that serve as important updates to the previous analysis for this 
thesis from 2016. In February 2017, the Government Accountability Office updated its 
High Risk Series report, GAO-17-317, by removing terrorism-related information sharing 
from its High-Risk List. The GAO goes on to state that the information was removed 
from the high-risk series due to the program manager for ISE achieving all nine of its 
actions items. However, the GAO does admit the continued challenges for the ISE:  
While this demonstrates significant and important progress, sharing 
terrorism-related information remains a constantly evolving work in 
progress that requires continued effort and attention from the Program 
Manager, departments, and agencies. Although no longer a high-risk issue, 
sharing terrorism-related information remains an area with some risk, and 
continues to be vitally important to homeland security, requiring ongoing 
                                                 
58 “Chairman McCaul’s Inaugural “State of Homeland Security Address,” House Committee on 
Homeland Security, December 7, 2016, https://homeland.house.gov/event/state-of-homeland-security-
address.  
59 GAO, Establishing Effective Mechanisms, 238.  
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oversight as well as continuous improvement to identify and respond to 
changing threats and technology.60  
The DHS Office of Inspector General (OIG) in its most recent report concerning 
domestic sharing of counterterrorism information outlines the continuing challenge that 
supports some of the analysis within this thesis:  
Updating or establishing new information sharing agreements 
among such entities should enhance coordination and collaboration, and 
reaffirm and formalize the roles and responsibilities of partners in the 
current information sharing environment. Similarly, although there is a 
national information sharing strategy, its implementation has been viewed 
to be uneven. The OIGs believe that the ODNI, DHS, and DOJ should 
review the interagency information sharing memorandum of 
understanding (MOU) and take necessary actions to update intelligence 
information sharing standards and processes among the departments, 
which we believe would result in better implementation of the strategy.61 
Additionally, the March 2017 DHS OIG report possibly represents the most 
comprehensive government-sourced report on counterterrorism information sharing and 
the ISE to date. The author of this thesis recommends further analysis of OIG-17-49 for 
updating related thesis topics concerning the ISE. 
B. LOCAL LEVEL ISE CHALLENGES  
At the local level, ISE challenges are characterized by uneven access of local law 
enforcement to quality intelligence and a lack of enough experienced, trained intelligence 
analysts in the field. Regional fusion centers and the NCTC are examples of integrated 
structures that facilitate precise, time-sensitive dissemination of classified intelligence. 
However, the principal critique of the ISE in this section is that the NCTC’s brand of 
classified data fusion remains exclusive to the NCR, far removed from the day-to-day 
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investigations and operations headed by local law enforcement agencies, despite the 
dramatic rise in local homegrown violent extremist cases since 2014.62  
The FBI’s JTTF program bears the brunt of tackling these terrorism cases within 
the nation’s most densely populated urban regions. However, as suggested by former 
Boston Police Chief Edward F. Davis, even with cleared police officers on these JTTFs, 
not all intelligence is shared with the local non-FBI partners that support JTTF activities. 
This dynamic continues despite JTTFs having access to all strategic and tactical level 
intelligence related to the current terrorism environment.63  
1. JTTF Control 
The FBI-led JTTF structure serves as the homeland’s principal domestic 
counterterrorism organization.64 How intelligence is accessed, collated, analyzed, and 
disseminated at the local level greatly impacts who attains access. However, local JTTFs 
are wholly under the control of an FBI supervisory special agent. Under the existing 
JTTF structure, the supervisory FBI special agent solely decides who accesses all 
investigation-related information, often restricting access to investigation team members. 
Since the 2013 Boston Marathon bombing, the FBI has been criticized for not sharing 
intelligence prior to attacks or attempts.65 One common theme in the criticism is that the 
perpetrators were at some point under FBI investigation with varying degrees of 
intelligence shared with local law enforcement prior to the attack. 66  Classified 
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information, such as the attackers’ prior watchlisting status or communication with online 
jihadists, was not often shared in its entirety with the FBI’s local law enforcement 
counterparts. As Dahl, Posner, Burch, and other scholars have suggested, these problems 
may reside in how domestic intelligence has been organized since the 2004 IRTPA 
created the ISE. Specifically, for the FBI as the principal domestic counterterrorism 
intelligence partner and ISE stakeholder, these problems reflect how the FBI prioritizes 
investigative approaches over intelligence.67  
One of the PM ISE’s primary missions is “supporting ISE partners to increasingly 
align policy, missions, and technology with their information sharing infrastructure at the 
domestic nexus of national security and public safety.”68 Though the FBI is one of the 
principal members of the ISE, the program manager is not ensuring FBI compliance with 
increased information sharing outside the JTTF structure. Perhaps the lack of PM 
oversight of individual members offers an explanation as to why the GAO is still critical 
of how the PM ISE is accomplishing its mission. The GAO has principally focused on the 
program manager’s progress in architecture, frameworks, and policies for the 15 agencies 
identified as part of the ISE. Nevertheless, due to the language in the 2004 IRTPA and 
subsequent executive orders, the PM ISE does not have the ability to ensure that national-
level ISE agencies comply with information-sharing goals. Additionally, while the FBI is 
part of the ISE, it continues to restrict access to information regarding counterterrorism 
cases and investigative decision making by local JTTF partner agencies, as described by 
former Boston Police Chief Edward F. Davis. Nonetheless, neither the GAO nor PM ISE 
acknowledges that local access to classified data is a critical priority to the ISE. Nor do 
they address the continued problems within FBI intelligence. 
                                                 
67 Adam D. M. Svendsen, “The Federal Bureau of Investigation and Change: Addressing US 
Domestic Counter-terrorism Intelligence,” Intelligence and National Security 27, no. 3 (2012): 371–397, 
doi: 10.1080/02684527.2012.668080.  
68 Program Manager Information Sharing Environment, 2016 Information Sharing Environment 




2. Unclassified Intelligence Quality 
As Busch and Givens describe, there is community consensus on the 
unprecedented amount of unclassified terrorism information available today.69 Specific 
ISE initiatives have led DHS to create the Homeland Security Information Network 
(HSIN) for the dissemination of unclassified intelligence. Numerous other organizations 
have also created unclassified intelligence portals based on these same ISE 
frameworks. 70  By allowing access across the FSLTT community to sensitive but 
unclassified intelligence, HSIN partially meets the requirements set forth in a 2005 
presidential memorandum concerning the information-sharing environment.71 However, 
a requirement for access to classified intelligence by FSLTT partners does not exist in the 
2004 IRTPA, the 2005 presidential memorandum, or other ISE publications. As Busch 
and Givens suggest in their article, current unclassified products lack operationally useful 
information as they omit “certain details to protect information sources and intelligence-
gathering methods. But these omissions limit the utility of the information. Without a 
source, a recipient cannot make independent judgments about how credible or non-
credible a piece of information is.”72 
Integrating classified intelligence into an all-source structured analysis program is 
instrumental in closing the current gaps in information sharing. Classified information 
does this in a variety of ways. First, classified intelligence can be used to provide leaders 
specific details on emergent terrorism capabilities and trends. Second, the most precise 
watchlisting data on individuals is classified. Third, integrating classified with 
unclassified intelligence creates a true all-source intelligence collection and analysis 
capability. This type of capability can lead to the production of high-quality integrated 
intelligence products that help drive more precise counterterrorism operations. Within 
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counterterrorism, there is no doubt of the importance of integrated all-source intelligence 
that John Miller describes in his interview. Miller characterized NYPD’s intelligence 
gathering and analysis approach, which leverages similar methods, sources, and 
techniques as the intelligence community. However, due to the need for driving rapid law 
enforcement operations and the limited number of cleared personnel, most police 
departments cannot integrate classified intelligence into similarly structured programs, 
effectively. 73  Yet providing classified intelligence to cleared intelligence analysis 
personnel and senior leaders for departments could drive strategic operations, if not joint 
interagency tactical operations.  
Additionally, as early as 2003, the GAO published studies concerning the need for 
the information-sharing environment to include and increase the amount of classified 
intelligence available to state and local authorities.74 With the passage of the Homeland 
Security Information Sharing Act in 2002, Congress also introduced the requirement to 
“share homeland security and classified information with . . . state and local 
governments.” 75  Regardless, as of 2017, integrating classified and unclassified law 
enforcement information into fused intelligence products at the local level remains a 
challenge principally due to access-related issues for local agencies and federal field 
personnel alike. 
On its webpage, the ISE has published the amended EO 13526, which provides 
the latest policy for handling classified information. While attempting to comply with 
Intelligence Community Directive (ICD) 501, which directs intelligence community 
activities for the “discovery and dissemination or retrieval of information within the 
intelligence community,” EO 13526 does not stipulate or mandate routine access to 
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classified information by local non–intelligence community partners. The executive order 
reads, 
In an emergency, when necessary to respond to an imminent threat to life 
or in defense of the homeland, the agency head or any designee may 
authorize the disclosure of classified information to an individual or 
individuals who are otherwise not eligible for access. Such actions shall be 
taken only in accordance with directives implementing this order and any 
procedure issued by agencies governing the classified information, which 
shall be designed to minimize the classified information that is disclosed 
under these circumstances and the number of individuals who receive it.76 
However as outlined above, there is one exception detailed in EO 13526 referring to 
“imminent threats,” but as events such as those in Orlando and Chelsea/Seaside suggest, 
even this one exception may be routinely ignored at the local level. 
While EO 13526 enables classified information sharing with local partner 
agencies, it does not provide the means to do so. The primary enabling capability that 
facilitates classified and integrated information sharing is a sensitive compartmented 
information facility (SCIF).77 As described previously, integrated all-sources intelligence 
collection, analysis, and dissemination are best achieved within SCIF spaces. These 
spaces have secure, cross-domain network access to unclassified, secret, and top-secret 
sensitive compartmented information (TS/SCI). The ODNI provides further technical 
security requirements for these facilities but does stipulate that all SCIFs be “constructed, 
operated, and maintained for reciprocal use by intelligence community elements.”78 It is 
only in SCIFs that analysts can view unclassified, secret, and top-secret intelligence and 
brief it to stakeholders. Local interagency SCIFs would enable the type of fused all-
source analytical production described earlier. These SCIFs could provide interagency 
access to unclassified and classified data alike for interagency intelligence personnel and 
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are the physical manifestation of “improving protection while expanding access.” 79 
While integrated SCIFs exist, these are almost exclusively located in the NCR or on 
military installations and do not necessarily support local operations or investigations.80 
3. SCIFs and Their Impact on Quality Intelligence 
Local ISE members do not have access to the same types of intelligence data that 
are readily available to organizations like the NCTC. State and major urban area fusion 
centers and law enforcement intelligence units often lack a SCIF or other classified space 
with the necessary intelligence community systems to coordinate classified intelligence 
sharing. 81 In its publications, the PM ISE addresses neither SCIFs nor the personnel 
needed to run and work in these facilities. In its last annual report on fusion centers, DHS 
does not specifically mention SCIFs, yet it openly acknowledges the challenges of 
maintaining properly cleared personnel working in lower-level classified spaces and 
accessing the full range of available classified material.82 DHS further explains in its 
National Network of Fusion Centers Final Report that fusion centers and the federal 
government should continue to facilitate access to classified systems and facilities that 
offer secret-level information through systems like the Homeland Security Defense 
Network (HSDN). However, the language that DHS uses to describe accessing classified 
information falls short of advocating that SCIFs are integrated into fusion centers or other 
local information-sharing facilities. 83  Additionally, it is impossible to construct and 
maintain a SCIF without the ability to maintain properly cleared personnel and without 
qualified onsite security personnel. Neither the PM ISE nor DHS addresses the relatively 
few SCIFs in the field and the role of a SCIF in improving the quality of shared data.  
                                                 
79 “Improving Protection While Expanding Access,” Program Manager Information Sharing 
Environment, accessed December 18, 2016, https://www.ise.gov/resources/standards-guides-best-
practices/improving-protection-while-expanding-access.  
80 Posner, Preventing Surprise Attacks, 148.  
81 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Network of Fusion Centers Final Report 
(Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2012), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/ 
files/publications/2012%20National%20Network%20of%20Fusion%20Centers%20Final%20Report.pdf.  
82 Ibid., 12–13.  
83 Ibid., 13–14.  
 
31 
Data quality at the local level is a critical issue. Despite the ever-growing 
availability of controlled unclassified information (CUI), the intelligence community still 
over-classifies and thereby restricts the dissemination of relevant terrorist data to local 
operators.84 Mechanisms are in place to access this classified information, but the best 
mechanism is the SCIF. Networks like HSDN are available outside SCIF spaces but still 
require other secured facilities to ensure proper protection of the data. While DHS 
acknowledges the need for an HSDN capability in fusion centers, routine access to the 
network and integration with higher classified data available through SCIFs is not 
occurring on a regular basis.85 Additionally, unclassified data available through multiple 
unclassified platforms—such as HSIN, Law Enforcement Online, and Regional 
Information Sharing Systems Secure Cloud (RISSNET)—are also not being integrated 
with higher classified data. As Busch and Givens suggest, these systems highlight efforts 
that have improved information sharing.86 However, the lack of enough personnel and 
the incredible volume of information they generate may actually be the reasons that many 
analysts still feel there are problems with information sharing. As previously mentioned, 
the NCTC and other federal agencies may have analysts and field liaisons that are 
properly cleared and have access to SCIFs and systems, but the volume of data may be 
overloading these analysts during routine operations.87 These issues demonstrate that the 
ISE and related legislation are limited; they neither specify a requirement for secure 
facilities nor mandate that TS/SCI information be shared and produced at the local level. 
While there are a variety of problems surrounding the issue of increased local access to 
classified intelligence, including over-classification, local security clearances, and limited 
access, the PM ISE has been slow to address them.  
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This chapter has outlined the existing challenges currently impacting information 
sharing across the FSLTT stakeholders at field and local levels. The GAO, House 
Homeland Security Committee, and others within in the field agree that the challenges 
can be summarized as poor and/or conflicting strategic policy implementation, uneven 
access, and poor data integration at the local level. Technology hurdles that impact the 
quality of information those field analysts access and the resultant analysis they can 
perform foster this dynamic. More specifically, while the 2004 IRTPA led to the creation 
of several information-sharing initiatives, evidence still suggests that vital intelligence is 
not shared at the highest possible levels Additionally, intelligence assets in the field who 
are primarily responsible for sharing information are few and have far fewer capabilities 
than their NCR-based counterparts. This has contributed to a continuing issue of stove-
piping intelligence, something that the 9/11 Commission and numerous other researchers 
following 9/11 have proven a core negative impact on domestic counterterrorism.88 Post-
9/11 reforms have focused on NCR-based intelligence community improvements and 
policy guidance, but the ISE has not fully engaged the FSLTT partners to ensure all 
available intelligence is being shared. 89  Furthermore, evidence suggests that the 
continued reliance on legacy structures like the JTTF and fusion centers has limited the 
sharing of pre-attack information with local law enforcement. 90 Figure 1 provides a 
notional graphic representing the imbalance within the current ISE.  
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Figure 1.  Present Day ISE Architecture  
The next chapter introduces two case studies for consideration in addressing these 
enduring ISE challenges. The case studies focus on local and specialized approaches to 
counterterrorism that when merged with other existing ISE-related concepts may lead to 
meaningful ISE reform. Meaningful reform resembles a system in which the intelligence 
community no longer overwhelmingly bases its best counterterrorism capabilities, like 
the NCTC, within the NCR, but instead cultivates the capabilities and advantages that 
local approaches bring. This thesis concludes with an overview of the best practices that 
combine local and DOD approaches in a realistic way. However, this thesis is mindful of 











III. MODELS TO ADDRESS ISE CHALLENGES 
Successful counterterrorism operations require robust, real-time 
information sharing. A data-point lost in the noise might be the key to 
disrupting a violent attack. Despite the enormous strides made in this area, 
more can be done to get the right information to the right people at the 
right time. After 9/11, intelligence fusion centers and more Joint Terrorism 
Task Forces were set up nationwide, recognizing that state and local law 
enforcement can be a force-multiplier in combating the threat. But they do 
not always have access to the critical information they need, which is why 
the U.S. government should redouble efforts to engage these frontline 
defenders in our counterterrorism efforts and facilitate two-way 
information sharing about threats.  
—Michael McCaul, Chair, House Homeland Security Committee, 
September 2016.91 
 
When faced with complex problems, organizations require the ability to adapt and 
collaborate at unprecedented levels regardless of their status as federal, state, local, 
private, or commercial institutions.92 The 2004 IRTPA created the ISE in an effort to 
address what the 9/11 Commission described as “lost opportunities” for the intelligence 
community and counterterrorism operations in terms of information-sharing reform.93 
The 9/11 Commission’s conceptual recommendation for improving government-wide 
information sharing was to replace the traditional intelligence “need-to-know” 
presumption with a “need-to-share” culture.94 Its primary recommendation led to the 
creation of the ODNI as an intelligence community chief officer to integrate information 
among all members and across all terrorism-related operations. Chapter II presented the 
challenges remaining for the ISE in terms of ensuring information-sharing across FSLTT 
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communities. Chapter III attempts to address these challenges by reviewing and then 
analyzing the two models that, if endorsed by the ISE and FSLTT partners, could remedy 
some of the ISE’s challenges. When the best practices of each model are combined, the 
SOF team-of-teams concept and the New York Police Department’s intelligence unit, 
they form a framework contributing to an environment that fosters “robust, real-time 
information sharing” to the lowest operator level possible.95 
A. THE SOF APPROACH 
The first case study this thesis reviews is the special operations forces (SOF) 
model. As detailed in the Special Operations Forces Reference Manual, SOF 
“encompass[es] the use of small units in direct or indirect military actions focused on 
strategic or operational objectives. These actions require units with combinations of 
specialized personnel, equipment, and tactics that exceed the routine capabilities of 
conventional military forces.” 96  These forces are augmented when deployed with a 
national intelligence support team (NIST) as well as other external and sometimes 
international capabilities to ensure mission success. These highly adaptable and flexible 
units have small footprints and operate under the “quiet professionals” mantra.97 The 
following paragraphs review the overall SOF concepts and structure as well as NIST’s 
background and capabilities. The structures and capabilities of the Combined Joint 
Special Operation Task Force (CJSOTF) and NIST were combined in Iraq in unique 
ways that provides examples of how they might be leveraged by the ISE. As acutely 
described in General Stanley McChrystal et al.’s Team of Teams, the CJSOTF hunted Al 
Qaida-in-Iraq and its leader Zarqawi from 2004 through 2007.98 
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1. SOF Concepts and Structure 
Doctrinally, SOF teams are small units with specialized, task-organized 
capabilities that operate in complex, austere environments, augmented with external 
intelligence community capabilities. 99  These SOF units are flexible enough to be 
reshaped for a variety of missions and are designed to “ensure effective collaboration in 
joint, interagency, and combined operational environments.”100 Operational units range 
in size from 10 to 21 for Army Special Forces and Navy SEAL teams, and up to 110 
members for Army Ranger battalions involving larger targets or missions.101  
Special forces units are all designed to facilitate rapid and adaptive operations 
when augmented with various support elements, ranging from organic communications to 
legal and military intelligence detachments. External support elements also collaborate in 
a joint operations environment with other units and can be tasked by a joint geographic 
commander to provide support to other external units operating in the same mission or 
operational area. This augmentation strategy allows SOF units that do not have their own 
assets for certain disciplines but are needed for a given mission, for example aviation, to 
cross-leverage the SOF capabilities of other services under the joint command structure. 
The ability to augment units with national capabilities is the defining aspect of CJSOTF, 
which is described later in this chapter. The task force structure ensures mission success 
by pooling resources under one mechanism, despite being under separate military 
services when not operationally deployed.  
One of the best practices of modern-day SOF is the joint planning process and the 
operations planning cell. The joint operational planning process is required for most 
counterterrorism and/or unconventional missions involving a joint task force. 102 The 
process occurs in a networked, collaborative environment that relies on routine dialogue 
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among senior leaders across multiple planning levels.103 The primary goal of this type of 
planning is to provide clear strategic guidance through frequent interaction to promote 
early understanding of mission objectives and intelligence requirements. The intent of 
SOF mission planning is to consider a wide-range of mission-related aspects from 
assumptions and risks to considerations and other factors that form the elements of the 
overall operational design.104 This operational design leads to detailed mission analysis, 
course of action (COA) development, war gaming, COA comparison, and other decision-
supporting processes prior to mission rehearsals. The planning cells are just one aspect of 
the overall joint planning group but may comprise sub cells that incorporate both 
operational and intelligence disciplines to analyze all aspects of potential missions.105 
The final result provides SOF and task force commanders with comprehensive, detailed, 
and flexible operations plans that help them make informed decisions from a variety of 
options. Lastly, through task organization, SOF mission planning and operations cells 
imbed representatives, including NIST members, from different support disciplines.106 
Figure 2 offers an example of SOF structures in a joint operational planning environment. 
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Figure 2.  Theater-Level Planning and Targeting for Organizational 
Structures107 
2. NIST Concepts and Structure 
The NIST concept has its origins in the early 1990s when the DOD reimagined 
how its military forces deployed to support multiple simultaneous “low-intensity” 
conflicts around the world once mission needs exceeded the capabilities of ordinary 
military units.108 The intelligence community had to innovate to support these new types 
of continuous operations in a world of “disorder.”109 NIST was one of the innovations to 
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support operations in the 1990s and into the early 2000s. The Joint Chiefs describes the 
NIST best, “The NIST is a nationally sourced team of intelligence and communications 
experts from Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 
National Security Agency (NSA), National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA), and 
other agencies. The NIST’s purpose is to provide a national-level, deployable all-source 
intelligence team” for task force commanders.” 110  NIST may comprise various 
intelligence community personnel from the DIA, NSA, NGA, and CIA. These personnel 
are deployed upon request by a joint task force (JTF) commander to “facilitate the flow 
of timely all-source intelligence between a JTF and Washington” during various types of 
crisis operations.111   
Participating national intelligence community partners send one to 20 volunteers 
to deployed NIST elements. These trained individuals have a tailored combination of 
skills and report to a team chief who is selected by the Joint Staff J-2 based on 
nominations from the intelligence community.112 NIST has an integrated communication 
structure that leverages both unique agency and operation command capabilities.113 And 
since NIST is deployed in support of a task force commander, thee teams perform 
functions at his or her behest. All intelligence generated in support of the JTF is made 
available to the respective parent organizations, the Joint Staff J-2, and ideally, the rest of 
the intelligence community depending on classification restrictions. However, the CIA 
member of NIST has the ability to make quick dissemination determinations of 
previously reviewed ORCON material. This tactical dissemination capability is key to 
facilitating intelligence sharing at the local level and back through the rest of the 
intelligence community. Additionally, NIST members can also determine secondary and 
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follow-on product dissemination.114 NIST cells are meant to deploy only for limited 
durations not exceeding 90 days and are intended to train theater intelligence assets once 
operations transition from crisis to “sustained operations.”115 
NIST capabilities ensure joint intelligence operations integrate unique military 
services and national intelligence capacities into a unified effort. Such capabilities align 
with Joint Chiefs intent by ensuring commanders receive accurate and timely intelligence 
that drives JTF operations and shapes long-term sustainment by “[surpassing] any single 
organization’s effort.” 116  One of the best practices NIST has achieved has been 
providing each member and the JTF commander intimate knowledge of parent-agency 
resources and capabilities. The NIST has provided dynamic intelligence over the years, 
supporting a variety of combat operations overseas, each with unique operational 
considerations. However, JTF commanders are concerned about the potential for 
intelligence community micromanagement and operational leaks, which often coincide 
with NIST deployers coordinating with their respective headquarters. However, JTF 
commanders can direct exactly when and how NIST members communicate with their 
headquarters. For example, in 1995, NIST members supporting Task Force Eagle in 
Bosnia were ordered not to disseminate information that was relevant to ongoing or 
future operations.117  
3. Team of Teams 
As General Stanley McChrystal et al. describes in Team of Teams, “The greatest 
innovations have not come from a lone inventor or from solving problems in a top-down, 
command-and-control style. Instead, the great successes—the creation of the computer, 
transistor, microchip, Internet—come from a ‘team of teams’ working together in pursuit 
of a common goal.”118 In Iraq following the 2003 invasion, in one of the nation’s most 
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complex counterterrorism environments, NIST augments alone were not enough to 
support successful JTF missions. Multiple NIST-type elements were integrated into a 
wider concept, the team of teams. The new team-of-teams concept leveraged and merged 
the full extent of the United States’ elite special forces and national intelligence with 
other, similar international capabilities. In Team of Teams, General McChrystal et al. 
illustrate how traditional SOF/NIST concepts became rigid and inadaptable to a new, 
complex fight.119 This section reviews the team-of-teams concept and structure as well as 
synopsizes how it evolved into a reimagined combination of existing SOF and NIST 
capabilities. 
a. Justification for Concept 
In the complex operating environment of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) in 2003–
2004, SOF units experienced significant challenges to information/intelligence 
sharing.120 Despite SOF units being the elite of the elite in counterterrorism operations, 
the system had significant flaws. Operators complained of not receiving intelligence that 
was relevant to their missions as well as not receiving follow-up analysis from data that 
they previously captured. 121  Supporting analysts complained that recoveries from 
operations had little intelligence value and did not fit with the established intelligence 
requirements.122 Additionally, the intelligence community did not facilitate rapid analysis 
and response, a critical step to drive follow-up operations, even when evidence of value 
was recovered. Such a dynamic can be described as a hierarchical, vertical organizational 
structure whereby operators and others at the lowest or more tactical levels of the task 
force are disconnected from the best support assets. Additionally, those support assets 
may be placed in positions to compete with each other rather than to collaborate on the 
overall outcome of the mission. 
                                                 
119 Ibid.  
120 Williams, Intelligence Support to Special Operation, 14–16.  
121 McChrystal et al. Team of Teams. 119–121.  
122 Ibid.  
 
43 
b. Concept Structure 
General McChrystal et al. detail operational challenges such as those outlined in 
the previous section in his first-person account from his time as the commanding officer 
of the CJSOTF for OIF. One of the themes expressed in Team of Teams is the scalable 
team approach, which allows individual teams to address complex issues with more 
adaptability than any top-down process ever could. General McChrystal et al. describe 
the reasoning behind this approach:  
The solution we devised was a “team of teams”—an organization within 
which the relationships between constituent teams resembled those 
between individuals on a single team: teams that had traditionally resided 
in separate silos would now have to become fused to one another via trust 
and purpose.123  
The CJSOTF environment for Iraq combined U.S. SOF with international Special 
Forces elements, eventually building up to 7,000 members for a complete task force.124 
Teams within the CJSOTF were tasked with gathering and applying intelligence. This 
intelligence was eventually fused into a daily briefing for all task force members and their 
component agencies. This briefing was securely broadcast as a virtual teleconference not 
only to all member organizations of the CJSTOF but also to the supporting intelligence 
community partners. While briefings of this nature are not unique and occur fairly 
regularly across a variety of domains in homeland security and the intelligence 
community, the unique culture of this operations and intelligence or “O&I” briefing 
called for and promoted an environment where anyone in attendance could present 
intelligence they felt was relevant to CJSOTF missions.125 In other words, anyone could 
present and counter-argue intelligence and planning analysis. In fact, McChrystal’s 
leadership style encouraged this cultural change. The culture shift of the O&I briefing 
replaced the “need-to-know” approach with a “need-to-share” culture. The change in 
culture sought to build trust by placing operators directly in contact with intelligence 
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analysts while facilitating regular/routine communication between all CJSOTF 
members.126 This shift created a wide-open communication structure that fostered what 
McChrystal et al. call “a holistic understanding of the interaction between all the moving 
parts. Everyone has to see the system in its entirety for the plan to work.”127 Within the 
scope of overall taskforce objectives, operators, and lower-level leaders also require 
empowerment to act on insights gained as part of this team-of-teams O&I process.128 
c. SOF, NIST, and Team of Teams Combined 
Lastly, while the combined SOF, NIST, and CJSOTF programs eventually 
experienced great success in degrading AQI and eliminating its leader, Zarqawi, for a 
variety of reasons, this new team-of-teams concept ended prematurely. Expense, force 
commitment, and overall leadership turnover likely drove this unique restructuring of the 
CJSOTF model to its conclusion. Nevertheless, commonalities and best practices drawn 
from the team-of-teams concept are applicable as solutions to ISE challenges. The team-
of-teams concept combined elite SOF, NIST, and other national and international 
capabilities with regular communication within the taskforce while maintaining a 
constant secure communication capability to national parent organization. 129 
Furthermore, operational planning combined imbedded intelligence analysts with 
operators and collectors resulted in holistic planning and a successful decentralized 
leadership style.130 While empowered to make insights and take actions within their own 
sphere of influence for the overall mission, all taskforce members became knowledgeable 
and invested in the overall operational outcome.131 The O&I brief synchronized CJSOTF 
activities by bringing together both the latest intelligence with the latest mission 
developments for real-time situational awareness that drove future operations.  
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B. THE NYPD APPROACH 
In “Local Approaches,” Dahl provides an appropriate overview of why alternative 
counterterrorism strategies are needed. He writes, “International security against 
terrorism is profoundly affected by domestic and local policies, and national defense 
against terrorism is best achieved through local approaches.”132 This section details the 
most comprehensive local approach for terrorism-related information sharing in the 
country, the NYPD model. It reviews the NYPD’s Intelligence Bureau, Intelligence 
Support and foreign liaison officer programs, and its Sentry and SHIELD programs. 
When combined, these programs offer the most comprehensive suite of intelligence 
collection and dissemination programs by a local law enforcement agency in the country.  
1. Intelligence Bureau  
The NYPD Intelligence Bureau offers potential solutions to remaining ISE 
challenges. The NYPD has one of the most comprehensive law enforcement intelligence 
programs in the country. This should not come as a surprise given that the NYPD is the 
nation’s largest police force with over 40,000 uniformed and civilian personnel.133 As 
Dahl states, NYPD’s model leverages the resources of local law enforcement and 
combines them with an unmatched relationship with the local population it is assigned to 
protect.134 Prior to 9/11, the NYPD had no organization that specialized in terrorism-
related intelligence even though the Intelligence Bureau “focused on protecting 
dignitaries and developing criminal intelligence.” 135  Today, the Intelligence Bureau 
incorporates an operational counterterrorism division, civilian analysts, an intelligence 
support program formed from external FSLT agencies, and a foreign liaison officer 
program. The Intelligence Bureau also established and hosts at least two programs vital to 
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information/intelligence sharing across law enforcement and public/private domains: the 
Sentry and SHIELD programs.136 
According to Dahl, the NYPD’s Intelligence Bureau is unique and its functions 
the envy of national intelligence community agencies and major metropolitan police 
forces alike. Its personnel range from uniformed field intelligence officers (FIOs) 
assigned to each of its precincts to the civilian analysts that are part of its Analytic Unit. 
Civilians who are part of the Analytic Unit are recruited from the intelligence 
community, NCTC, CIA and other government organizations and research centers. These 
civilian analysts also have advanced degrees and are recruited from our nation’s top 
universities and research institutions. 137  Uniformed FIOs serve as “core collection” 
officers who gather information about possible ties to radicalization and follow up on 
leads developed from reports or other intelligence collection sources like social 
media. 138  This local human intelligence (HUMINT) capacity surpasses that of any 
ordinary police department and leverages the very population it serves to protect. As John 
Miller describes in the interview conducted for this thesis, the NYPD is now a “majority 
minority,” meaning it has successfully recruited its ranks from the melting pot of the 
city’s diverse population.139 The NYPD’s diversity gives its intelligence capacity organic 
language skills and an unsurpassed local cultural knowledge. The precinct FIOs and 
investigating detectives communicate directly with the civilians of the Analytic Unit to 
work cases jointly, assist with research, and then coordinate with external agency officers 
of the Intelligence Support Program (ISP), which is collocated with the Analytic Unit.  
2. Intelligence Support Program 
The NYPD’s ISP hosts over 30 federal, state, local, and international partners 
that, in addition to working for their respective agencies in the city, also have part-time 
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desk hours with the NYPD Intelligence Unit and a 24/7 communications capability to 
support crisis and special event operations. Participation is voluntary by the agency; 
however, external agencies jump at the opportunity to participate in order to have access 
to the NYPD programs that are collocated. Collocated within NYPD intelligence spaces 
are programs such as the Lower Manhattan Security Initiative (LMSI) and the High 
Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA) cell. The ISP program co-leverages the same 
personnel and analytical capabilities for an integrated all-source (unclassified) approach 
to local investigations.  
Both HIDTA and LMSI have the added advantage of leveraging NYPD’s best 
technologies, all of which are accessible through the ISP program. Thousands of private 
and public security cameras, license plate readers, and other technologies, such as 
advanced facial recognition analysis, are monitored 24/7 by NYPD’s operations centers 
and are part of their “Domain Awareness System,” which streams all information back to 
the local and regional operations centers.140 NYPD’s John Miller describes the impact 
these programs have had: “A level of networking, a tightness of weaving that law 
enforcement fabric together across borders and cultures … has been extraordinarily 
productive and important.”141 Finally, agencies that participate in the ISP can also bring 
in their own unique unclassified systems and databases to augment access to NYPD. 
These databases give analysts and liaison officers assigned to the ISP, cross-domain 
capabilities that mirror or even rival the capabilities of national intelligence community 
organizations. 
3. Liaison Program 
One of the more contentious programs NYPD created after 9/11 has been its 
foreign liaison officer program. 142  The program involved posting uniformed NYPD 
officers in now 13 different foreign countries or foreign-based organizations around the 
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world. 143  While the NYPD liaison officers are based at foreign posts, they do not 
investigate foreign crimes and not authorized to conduct typical law enforcement 
collection in their host countries. However, NYPD’s liaison officers serve the vital 
function of facilitating information flow between the NYPD and foreign, local police 
department hosts with an emphasis on examining potential threats to NYC. These liaison 
officers are also based in organizations such as EUROPOL and Interpol, which focus on 
transnational crime and terrorism. Having officers embedded in these organizations 
avoids having to station officers in 60–100 different countries. As Miller described 
during his interview, “We’ve got people in Interpol and Europol because that’s one-stop 
shopping.”144  
However, the program is not without criticism, mostly from federal agencies. 
Dahl describes this tension:  
Especially in the first few years after the programme was initiated, the 
international programme led to conflicts between the NYPD and the FBI, 
which maintains its own Legal Attaches, or “Legats,” around the world. 
One such turf struggle occurred after a terrorist bombing in Madrid, Spain, 
in 2004, when the NYPD sent an intelligence liaison team to Spain 
without consulting with the FBI.145  
Criticism from federal agencies such as the FBI often centers on the need for “one voice” 
for foreign-based U.S. law enforcement to reduce confusion on the part of the foreign 
host country. Relying solely on one federal agency to conduct foreign law enforcement 
liaisons restricts the dissemination of information collected during the investigative 
process.  
To its credit, the NYPD has leveraged the information it has gathered through its 
foreign liaisons to the mutual benefit of the NYPD and their hosts, by publishing 
products of intelligence value that are shared not only locally and nationally. The NYPD 
also shares its analysis with the foreign partner law enforcement organizations. The 
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greatest success of NYPD’s foreign liaison officer program occurred during the terrorist 
attacks in Mumbai in 2008.146 Although the NYPD did not have an officer already based 
in India, it was able to send an experienced senior officer who had previously visited 
India on official business. The officer was sent to India while the attacks were still 
ongoing and that officer was able to relay near real-time information back to NYC 
officials regarding the tactics used in the attacks. 147  Bureau leaders then used this 
information to assess NYPD’s Emergency Services Unit (ESU) and the department took 
steps to improve its specific capabilities designed to defeat a similar attack if perpetrated 
in New York. Additionally, the Intelligence Bureau produced and shared an analysis of 
the attacks through its SHIELD program to city and nationwide private businesses.148  
4. Sentry and SHIELD Programs 
The reporting that the above programs tap into still largely depends on official 
sources and investigations. In order to expand its collection capabilities into more private 
and public organizations, the NYPD created the Sentry and SHIELD programs. These 
programs combined bring together hundreds of organizations from across the city, 
country, and world to share the latest intelligence analysis, best practices, and training all 
in the name of increased networking. Once a year, the NYPD hosts Sentry program 
members in a conference at NYPD headquarters where over a 158 state and local law 
enforcement agencies attend and share data on the latest gang, narcotics, and other 
criminal trends in a secure environment.149 Agendas for the conference in previous years 
have featured a variety of speakers from organizations like the Texas Department of 
Public Safety, Pennsylvania State Police, and the U.S. Military Academy at West Point. 
These speakers have also presented material on a wide range of topics, from 
counterterrorism best practices to jihadist messaging to drug cartels. 150  John Miller 
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outlines how the NYPD leverages these types of briefings, “We have Sentry members do 
their own presentations. When this started, it was built to be the NYPD’s network. We 
brought the FBI, Secret Service, ATF into it on the idea that all our networks need to 
touch.”151 The NYPD’s multiagency approach enables a wider range of varying analysis 
that can influence and be incorporated into their counterterrorism strategies.  
While the Sentry program largely hosts other official law enforcement and 
government agencies, the NYPD recognizes the informational and networking value of 
inviting public and private institutions to the information-sharing table as well. Its 
SHIELD program is the standard for partnership and outreach: “NYPD Shield program 
exemplifies public-private sector information as well as vertical information sharing. 
NYPD Shield enlists local business owners to be the ‘eyes and ears’ of the NYPD in 
identifying potential terrorist threats.”152 While on the surface the sharing of intelligence 
may just seem as another top-down or vertical process where agencies ‘preach’ at 
business owners and share low-quality trend data, but it’s much more. By bringing in 
business and industry partners who are the potential targets of terrorists’ activity, the 
NYPD is also encouraging horizontal information sharing that builds trust and 
‘routineness’ to the information sharing.153 This is how the NYPD links privately owned 
security cameras and other privately held data collection methods to its Lower Manhattan 
Security Initiative program among others, and in exchange, businesses receive access to 
NYPD Intelligence and threat briefings from invited guest speakers such as the NCTC, 
the ODNI, or FBI. 154  John Miller outlines the importance of NYPD’s interagency 
approach: “That’s where we get access to the kinds of information that all of those 
industries have their own expertise in that we could never match.” 155  The dynamic 
creates a secondary effect in that business owners now trust their local precincts more and 
reach out to city officials more frequently on local issues.  
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5. NYPD Information Sharing 
The NYPD approach to information consists of horizontal and vertical sharing 
across the various components of its Intelligence Bureau: the Intelligence Support, 
foreign liaison officer, and the Sentry and SHIELD programs. All work together to 
provide the best analysis to aid investigations and operational planning but also to drive 
an unmatched level of public/private information sharing. While not all local law 
enforcement has the resources that NYPD does, similar local law enforcement driven 
programs are scalable and can serve as examples for smaller local agencies to emulate.156 
Given the successful terrorism cases the NYPD approach has solved, when combined 
with other information sharing best practices, many domestic local agencies could 
leverage similar concepts in their counterterrorism fight.157 
C. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION 
The implications for solving some the ISE challenges by both models could be 
profound. The success of both the SOF and NYPD models for information sharing 
largely centers around building trust and fostering a sense of shared investment in 
successful operational outcomes. Both models build structures that rely primarily on 
fitting the right personnel in the right collaborative environment, facilitated by the right 
technology to cross interagency divides. Both models recruit the best of the best, meaning 
the most experienced and skilled personnel, to participate. Both foster open lines of 
horizontal cross-agency communication and vertical lines of communication with 
external intelligence community partners as well as their respective stakeholders. Both 
models combine and pool resources with external supporting agencies since both 
recognize that no single agency can complete the mission on its own. Both models 
demonstrate how operators within each serve as intelligence collectors and users. Both 
models leverage the skills of their operators at building relationships with their respective 
local target communities as means to gathering better intelligence through cultivating 
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local trust. All of these best practices have built interagency and interdisciplinary trust, 
something rarely seen in domestic counterterrorism operations.  
However, the ISE mandate did not lead to the creation of the models referenced 
nor did ISE representatives directly participate in or created these structures. In fact, 
research for this thesis revealed little if any recognition of ISE PM connections to the 
models themselves. The models arose out of unique and local operational demands to 
meet specific threats and/or missions. Therein lies the most significant challenge for the 
ISE: its own connectivity to unique missions and local operational needs. For example, in 
New York, while fusion centers like the New York State Intelligence Center (NYSIC) 
have been created, endorsed, and improved under the auspices of the ISE, NYPD’s 
intelligence model is not part of the national fusion center network.158 The PM ISE is 
greatly involved with ensuring intelligence community participation in the NCTC and 
other national-level classified terrorism intelligence collaboration. But the ISE was not 
involved with the team-of-teams operations that were under local military commander 
control. While the PM ISE has influence over national intelligence community 
information sharing initiatives, their role in how the intelligence community jointly 
participates in military operations is limited. Intelligence sharing for military operations 
is largely determined by established joint military policy and not the ODNI, the 2004 
IRTPA, or by current PM ISE guidance.  
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IV. INFORMATION SHARING ENVIRONMENT: 
THE WAY FORWARD 
This thesis combined policy and case study analysis with anecdotal commentary 
from senior leaders on the current state of the ISE for local field counterterrorism 
operations. The findings reveal the need for a reimagined homeland information-sharing 
environment. Senator Michael McCaul, NYPD’s John Miller, Erik Dahl and other 
scholars, as well as senior leaders all agree that current intelligence support for the 
domestic counterterrorism environment needs improvement. The author of this thesis 
imagines a collaborative counterterrorism environment wherein all FSLTT capabilities 
are leveraged. To accomplish this objective, current mechanisms—fusion centers, the 
NCTC, the JTTF, and field intelligence liaisons established following 9/11—must all be 
combined in a way that builds trust among the “owners” of these capabilities.  
Merging both the team-of-teams and NYPD models in their entirety would be 
almost impossible for a variety of reasons. The models would likely face implementation 
difficulties, from associated costs to command and control. Additionally, domestic 
implementation of several team-of-teams concepts would also likely face restrictions 
under the Posse Comitatus Act, which limits direct DOD support to domestic, civilian 
law enforcement communities but does not outright prevent it. However, blending the 
best practices of each model with ISE endorsement could pave the way for reducing the 
strategic, tactical, and technological challenges that persist and impede domestic 
information sharing. Strategically, the ISE would have to acknowledge that not all 
information sharing can or should be controlled through Washington, instead endorsing a 
more decentralized approach by issuing policy and funding guidance that advocates for 
sending national capabilities where they are needed most—the field.  
Local information sharing initiatives need an advocate that can incorporate their 
best practices into national programs and capabilities. Tactically, the ISE would have to 
endorse local initiatives such as the NYPD and begin to change overly restrictive policies 
limiting the involvement of local law enforcement agencies in nationwide domestic 
intelligence activities and information sharing. In many ways, this has already begun, by 
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having organizations like the Major City Chiefs Association and the NYPD liaise with 
agencies and leaders in Washington. However, the ISE must require all federal agencies, 
the FBI in particular, to share more information with the local jurisdictions they support. 
As discussed in Chapter II, given the gaps in authority under the 2004 IRTPA and 
subsequent executive orders, Congress and the White House have to collaborate on 
revising existing law to grant ODNI and PM ISE the necessary authority to enforce 
accountability for any ISE solutions. Part of any revisions to these laws and executive 
orders would also need to include language endorsing local law enforcement participation 
in PM ISE’s various advisory councils as well. This chapter reviews the remaining 
challenges for blending the models.  
A. BEST PRACTICES OVERVIEW 
A common failure in counterterrorism was evident in the case of the 2013 Boston 
Marathon bombing and in other cases since then: one agency wrongly determined that the 
subject of interest was no threat. This decision was not carried out in a collaborative 
fashion among all FSLTT partners whose jurisdictions were the targets of these attacks, 
but rather in a stove-piped, top-down approach by a federal entity. The best practices 
from the models discussed in Chapter III would mitigate this problem by making all 
aspects of an investigation into these individuals’ parts of a collaborative interagency 
cell. Cells of this kind would feature highly specialized multijurisdictional operators 
working alongside the nation’s best intelligence capabilities. Teams would have the latest 
technology and communications capacities to facilitate rapid intelligence collection, 
analysis, and sharing to drive the prevention operation. The collective cells would have 
the responsibility to keep local and national senior decision makers routinely informed 
about operations and relevant intelligence that has influenced the decision-making 
process. Ultimately, the cells would have an empowered command structure with one 
common operational goal: preventing attacks instead of case investigation.  
This concept will take time to build, and it will be particularly important to build 
trust among all partner agencies and disciplines. At all levels of government, mistakes 
may be made, such as leaks of classified information, but preventing the loss of life in 
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another terrorist attack on U.S. soil demands that intelligence and law enforcement 
communities reimagine how they counter terrorism. Gone should be the days of single 
agencies having sole responsibility for domestic counterterrorism operations since 
evidence has established that one agency―one structure alone―cannot handle the 
overwhelming number of terrorist and HVE cases. The national intelligence community 
must realize that there are alternatives to dealing with the overwhelming volume of 
intelligence data on its own. National intelligence partners should be forced to broaden 
their capabilities by incorporating local law enforcement collection and analysis in a way 
that considers alternative theories. At times when a specific domestic threat is not 
imminent, the intelligence community should invest in regular joint analysis and trend 
briefings on global terrorist tactics with local partner agencies.  
One of the critical recommendations of this thesis is to ban the use of the ORCON 
dissemination control for all terrorism-related intelligence. Currently, the 2004 IRTPA 
allows for intelligence agencies to ignore specific guidance from the White House and 
ODNI to share terrorism intelligence, regardless of classification, to the lowest levels 
possible across the ISE domains. However, the 2004 IRTPA provides a legal loophole 
that intelligence agencies exploit to restrict dissemination of terrorism data despite the 
legislation’s intent to increase terrorism data sharing. Banning ORCON would at least 
allow federal field intelligence officers to share classified intelligence more routinely 
with cleared senior NYPD personnel and open the door to merge the SOF and NYPD 
models for sharing information both horizontally and vertically.  
By leveraging the most successful, specialized, adaptable capabilities the 
homeland has to offer, the HSE will be better suited to address the challenges to ISE that 
remain today. However, this will take investment by all agencies. All must contribute not 
only their best personnel but also their best facilities, tactics, methods, technology, 
funding, and intelligence. Since terrorism crosses all jurisdictions and existing law 
already provides the legal authorities for sharing terrorism intelligence across these 
boundaries, ensuring compliance should be only a matter of national prioritization, and 
local-level acceptance. The PM ISE could be the national body if existing policies were 
rewritten to promote FSLTT partner participation. This thesis offers four core 
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recommendations that need implementing before moving this type of interagency 
collaboration forward: revise existing (1) ODNI/PM ISE and (2) intelligence community 
authorities, (3) update the language of the Posse Comitatus Act to enable the use of SOF 
in advisory roles to local law enforcement, and (4) solicit local law enforcement input 
and investment in a new ISE. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Research for this thesis included an interview conducted with the NYPD’s DCI 
John Miller, who revealed the complexity within the offices of the DNI and PM ISE. The 
2004 IRTPA and follow-on executive orders, including EO 12333, leave gaps in the 
authority of the ODNI to hold the intelligence community accountable. Additionally, the 
PM ISE wears two hats as it “lives halfway in between the White House and ODNI.”159 
Revising the 2004 IRPTA and EO 12333 as well as housing the PM ISE in the executive 
branch’s National Security Council (NSC) could help solidify the authorities and 
encourage compliance of ISE members.  
1. Rewrite the 2004 IRTPA 
It may be time to amend the 2004 IRTPA based on feedback from senior 
intelligence officials, considering that no members of the House Intelligence Committees 
served as principle authors when it was written 13 years ago. 160 Although Congress 
struggles to agree with the executive branch, it should consider repealing or revising 
section 1018 of the legislation because it prevents the DNI from abrogating the 
authorities of the intelligence community’s department heads.161 Eliminating or revising 
this provision would provide the DNI direct control over the intelligence community and 
ensure compliance is enforced through a single office, at least for all intelligence 
community operations involving terrorism. Additionally, the IRTPA would have to 
include new language that details specific types of information to be shared as part of the 
                                                 
159 Miller, interview.  
160 Hayden, “State of the Craft.”  
161 Ibid.  
 
57 
ISE, including raw and finished data, local law enforcement data, and foreign 
government data. 162  Then, intelligence community agencies would have to legally 
comply with established ODNI policies and guidance on all ISE activities or risk 
budgetary and legal penalties.  
However, a change in this role for the ODNI would conflict with the role of the 
Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USDI), who currently serves as the DOD’s 
senior intelligence official and has line-item control over some of the intelligence 
community’s largest intelligence agencies such as the NSA. 163  True change for the 
authorities of the ODNI may require either eliminating this position by the Congressional 
Armed Services Committee or amending EO 12333 to clarify the USDI portfolio. This 
recommendation would then have the effect that Lederman describes as “clarifying the 
accountability for the intelligence community’s performance,” which is important for 
intelligence sharing reform.164  
2. Update EO 12333 
The authors of the 2004 IRPTA wanted to leave responsibility for determining the 
relationship between the ODNI and the intelligence community agency leads to the 
president.165 However, EO 12333 was updated in 2003, 2004, and 2008 with language 
reinforcing the IRPTA guidance that the ODNI not abrogate the authority of the 
intelligence community heads.166 To implement the recommendations of this thesis, EO 
12333 needs updating again. That update should include language extending the authority 
of the ODNI over intelligence community classification standards and information 
dissemination controls, banning the use of ORCON for all terrorism intelligence, and 
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extending oversight over military intelligence capabilities to support domestic terrorism 
threats. The Foreign Intelligence and Surveillance Act (FISA) and the USA PATRIOT 
Act specify the types of intelligence that can be collected on U.S. persons and explains 
what can be shared with local law enforcement and intelligence agencies respectively.167 
However, more specific guidance is needed to increase the sharing of classified 
intelligence with FSLTT partners. 168 Since EO 12333 provides the primary executive 
authority over the intelligence community, perhaps it should provide details on how the 
ODNI and PM ISE implement the strategy.  
3. Update Posse Comitatus Act, Title 10, and Title 50 
The Posse Comitatus Act of 1878 specifically permits only the president to 
authorize the use of federal military forces for law enforcement within domestic 
boundaries and then only under “exigent circumstances.”169 But the Act does not outright 
prevent the use of intelligence assets domestically.170 Today, the executive and legislative 
branches closely review requests for direct DOD support to civilian law enforcement 
agencies.171 Given the age of the statute, its authors likely had not conceived of the need 
to use intelligence assets to protect U.S. citizens from terrorism. Perhaps it is time Posse 
Comitatus be revised to include language specific to the problem set this thesis addresses. 
An update to Posse Comitatus should include language that allows for the use of both 
state active duty (SAD) personnel in homeland security roles and highly trained SOF 
personnel to augment existing counterterrorism capabilities. 172  As with JTF Empire 
Shield, under presidential authorization, military forces could augment local law 
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enforcement at all major airports and other critical infrastructure locations. An additional 
provision to Posse Comitatus should also allow SOF capabilities to augment various CT 
missions supporting local enforcement on individuals with a nexus to terrorism in either 
an advisory/training capacity or in supporting actual prevent/capture missions.173  
Additionally, in order to support intelligence-reform, Title 10 and Title 50 likely 
need modification. Both Title 10 and 50 clarify the roles of the U.S. Secretary of 
Defense. Title 10 describes the authorities of the DOD for military operations while Title 
50 describes the extent of intelligence activities in covert versus overt operations. 174 
While Title 10 currently allows for the establishment of state and federal military 
coordination in support of JTTFs, further authorities may be needed for establishing 
collaborative planning and operational cells across FSLTT domains.175 Combining these 
authorities for counterterrorism purposes would allow highly trained SOF operators to 
serve as advisors to local partners’ interdiction and counterterrorism operations while 
also leveraging the teams-of-teams concept with integrated intelligence community 
support. Each entity would then retain its authority under existing law. When cells 
disagree on intelligence and operational decision making for any given target, a briefing 
at the highest classification possible for all senior leader stakeholders would aid the final 
operational decision-making process. The roles of NSA and DIA also need revisiting in a 
revised Title 50. Title 50 establishes and defines the authorities of two of the largest 
intelligence agencies. Along with EO 12333, Title 50 could enable these intelligence 
agencies to leverage their vast capabilities to support domestic counterterrorism 
operations under a hybrid SOF–local law enforcement model.176 
There may be an added mutual benefit to this type of augmented SOF–local law 
enforcement relationship. In Convergence: SOF and Civilian Law Enforcement, Jon B. 
Alexander describes how the escalation of threat actor capabilities, both foreign and 
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176 Wall, “Demystifying,” 99.  
 
60 
domestic, has blurred the lines between wholly military and law enforcement 
capabilities.177 To meet the growing challenge of gathering intelligence and targeting 
terrorist networks, SOF has had to seek law enforcement–style warrants for the first time 
in history. In foreign sustainment operations, SOF has also been involved in law 
enforcement–style policing operations.178 Both missions are not something SOF has ever 
trained for in the past. 179  Domestically, law enforcement agencies have encountered 
extremely well-armed threat actors and have had to deploy military-style capabilities 
without the benefit of the highly specialized training SOF receives. By updating Posse 
Comitatus, Title 10, and Title 50 of the U.S. Code, the SOF and law enforcement 
communities could forge better joint training and operational relationships that add to the 
capabilities of their independent but related missions.  
4. Revise PM ISE’s Roles  
Today, while some lone intelligence community agencies share intelligence, they 
still tend to make operational decisions independent of a joint environment. A revamped 
PM ISE should aid intelligence sharing with local officials as part of the National 
Security Council or the National Intelligence Council. In addition, the PM ISE should 
review highly classified intelligence community intelligence on international and 
domestic threats and direct that intelligence to the hybrid SOF–law enforcement cells, 
which could then begin real-time mission planning. Moreover, a new ODNI with 
improved authorities could ensure intelligence community compliance with PM ISE 
tasking. As previously discussed, a revised information-sharing concept works only if 
local jurisdictions have more access to SCIFs and more collaboration with field 
intelligence assets across the FSLTT domain. Then, the PM ISE would move from being 
a policy advocate to having a more hands-on role of implementing and directing 
information sharing. The counterterrorism community has the technology to 
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communicate in real-time across the globe; it should be able to communicate locally and 
collaborate on local terrorism threats.  
C. FINAL CONSIDERATIONS 
This thesis considers the current global and national terrorism threat as one that 
has grown only since 9/11. Successful domestic terrorist attacks in the years 2014 
through 2017 have revealed cracks in the current approach to domestic counterterrorism. 
Yet our nation has experienced success internationally in targeting terrorists using the 
team-of-teams approach. This thesis has proposed a more unified approach to 
counterterrorism that merges the best capabilities from military, federal, and local 
approaches. To accomplish reform, the nation needs to rebuild trust in the intelligence 
community, solidify the roles of the ODNI and PM ISE, and build on operational 
successes. Opponents of the proposed changes to ODNI may argue that to do so would 
effectively eliminate the capability for intelligence community agencies to disagree 
independently with the ODNI. This may lead to entrenching hierarchical relationships 
between the ODNI and the intelligence community heads, thereby hurting collaboration 
and alternative analysis. Perhaps any legislative update of ODNI authorities over the 
intelligence community heads need only include language relevant to information-sharing 
equity. Congress could give the ODNI budgetary authority over intelligence-community 
information-sharing programs while developing options for increased research and 
development in multi-domain information-sharing technologies. By having control over 
all budgetary decisions for information sharing in the intelligence community, the ODNI 
and its ISE PM would have clearer accountability for information sharing lapses and a 
faster ability to reform or develop domestic information-sharing programs. 
For agencies at the local level, existing intelligence-sharing mechanisms work. 
One case study in particular highlights what can be accomplished through the PM ISE’s 
office. Hocevar et al. reviewed the role the PM ISE had in sponsoring a framework called 
multimodal information sharing team (MIST), for collaborative information-sharing 
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across the transportation port domain.180 The MIST program was designed to bring the 
multiple stakeholders across the Port of Baltimore’s interdependent transportation 
domain into one intelligence-sharing framework. As the sponsor for MIST workshops, 
PM ISE held several meetings and made recommendations that helped actualize its core 
objectives:  
• Advance responsible information sharing to further counterterrorism and 
homeland security missions.  
• Improve nationwide decision making by transforming information 
ownership to stewardship. 
• Promote partnerships across federal, state, local and tribal governments, 
the private sector and internationally.181 
Over 30 organizations participated in the workshops, which helped the Port of Baltimore 
identify core information sources, systems, and approaches to better share sensitive but 
unclassified (SBU) information.182 While similar information-sharing forums alone fall 
short of the recommendations of this thesis, the MIST framework does demonstrate the 
hands-on approach the PM ISE would take if a national SOF–law enforcement cell 
concept came to fruition. The PM ISE could operationalize the MIST model on a national 
scale to increase multimodal information-sharing across the nation. However, as 
successful as MIST was, its achievements in increasing information sharing in the 
Baltimore Port were confined to that narrow domain. The strategic, tactical, and 
technological challenges that remain for the ISE should be addressed by updating several 
pieces of related legislation, subsequent orders, and policies as previously outlined. 
Lastly, reimagining counterterrorism operations means that no single federal 
agency would be responsible for terrorism investigations and prevention. However, 
reform may mean a more collaborative multiagency approach with an interdependent, 
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multijurisdictional mission area that combines the nation’s best operators and 
collaborative activities. As John Miller explains, “Everything that’s working right now is 
working really well.” 183 Nevertheless, Miller suggests the culture of the intelligence 
community needs to change as there is still a strong belief that “information is power.”184 
Until that dynamic across government changes, the potential political will to enforce 
implementation and compliance for intelligence-sharing reform is unlikely. Programs 
such as the intelligence community’s A-Space, Razor, and Catalyst, as outlined by Miller, 
were designed to help analysts share and communicate with one another.185 However, 
following the noteworthy cases involving leaks of national security intelligence, these 
programs have been shuttered.  
Perhaps deliberate and comprehensive intelligence reform could reignite 
investment in new technologies that enable collaboration while protect classified national 
security intelligence from leaks and espionage. In a recent interview for a WNYC 
podcast, Miller encapsulates some of the complexities regarding intelligence reform:  
If you look at the history of intelligence and policing … having rules and 
structure, even rules that … make your job harder sometimes, those rules 
are your friend. Intelligence collection in a free and democratic society 
without strict rules always ends up running aground.186  
Intelligence reform must strike a careful balance between enabling collection and 
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